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ABSTRACT
Joseph Tainter's theory of societal collapse is applied in an examination of the U.S. Air
Force's aircraft acquisition system in order to gain insight into the enterprise's lagging
performance. Theories of collapse at both the societal level and the organizational level are
reviewed. Tainter's interrelationship between increasing system complexity and diminishing
marginal returns is highlighted as especially relevant to the performance of the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise.
Using Tainter's theory as a framework, evidence is gathered leading to the conclusions that
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is highly complex and as a result is experiencing
diminishing marginal returns. Tainter's framework is then also used to explain why past attempts
to reform the enterprise have fallen short of their goals. Previous reform efforts, in the form of
reorganizations and senior leader initiatives, have been ineffectual beyond the short term because
they fail to reduce the underlying level of complexity within the enterprise. The use of
workarounds by stakeholders within the enterprise are shown to be efforts to increase marginal
returns and avoid overcomplexity.
The primary implication of viewing the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise through the
lens of Tainter's theory of collapse is that in order to be effective, any effort undertaken to
improve the performance of the enterprise must reduce the overall level of complexity within the
system. Additional insights include the use of current workarounds as leading indicators of
complexity or overly burdensome processes. Lastly, senior acquisition leaders should be
prepared should a collapse of the enterprise occur. A vision of a much less complex enterprise
should be advocated.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ricardo Valerdi
Title: Research Affiliate, Center for Technology, Policy & Industrial Development and Associate
Professor of Systems & Industrial Engineering, University of Arizona
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Thesis Motivations
As a member of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise since 1994, I have marveled at
the size and complexity of the system. It involves thousands of military members, government
employees and contractors. In its entirety, it spans the entire "cradle-to-grave" weapon system
lifecycle from research and development to sustainment and eventual retirement.
Over this same time span, I have observed and experienced many attempts, undertaken by
senior leaders, to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the system. While each of
these efforts may have generated some improvement, very few would argue that system
performance has substantially improved over the long term. Aircraft costs and fielding schedules
continue to far exceed initial estimates.
Throughout my 18 years of experience, I have consistently heard fellow professionals within
both the Air Force and its supporting contractors predict the "collapse" of the current acquisition
system. These statements have sometimes been uttered by leaders as an impetus to change. More
often they are uttered by individuals working within the system out of frustration with the
difficulty of making progress within the enterprise. While these comments are often flippant in
nature and also uttered with emotion, they prompt one to reflect on the concept of collapse and
the various theories that seek to explain its occurrence.
In 1988, anthropologist Joseph Tainter, in his book The Collapse of Complex Societies,
argued that societies become susceptible to collapse as they increase their level of complexity in
an effort to solve problems. Tainter further asserted that maintaining all of this complexity
requires a significant "energy subsidy" in the form of resources and people. When the value
gained is less than the investments necessary to maintain the increased complexity, the society is
ripe for collapse to a less complex, more sustainable structure.
Upon reading Tainter's book in 2010, I was struck by how much his theory and examples
resonated with my experiences working within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. The
realization that Tainter's theory of collapse had important implications for the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise was further bolstered by insights into system behavior gained over the
course of completing the System Design and Management Program.
These linkages were the genesis of this thesis, which examines the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise from the perspective of Tainter's theory in an effort to understand why past
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efforts to improve the enterprise have fallen short of their objectives. My hypothesis is that
these efforts to improve the enterprise fall short of their objectives because they fail to
address the underlying level of complexity within the system.
Additionally, the level of complexity present in the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
makes the enterprise increasingly vulnerable to collapse. Viewing the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise through the lens of Tainter's theory of collapse provides an understanding
of how the enterprise reached its current complex state and why efforts to improve performance
fall short of their goals. More importantly, Tainter's theory also provides a way forward to
prevent collapse.
1.2 Complexity Defined
In order to fully appreciate Tainter's theory and its implications for the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise, it is important to first understand how he defines complexity. Because the
word complexity is used in multiple ways across a wide spectrum of disciplines, Tainter takes
the time to clarify his definition in his 2012 publication with Patzek. The use of the term
complexity here is broad: Complexity emerges from "two elements: the diversity of things to be
done, and the coordination required to get them done." (Tainter & Patzek, 2012)
"These two elements introduce what the development of complexity in human societies
has entailed. It has consisted of adding more parts, especially more kinds of parts, and
organizing to coordinate those parts." (Tainter & Patzek, 2012)
Simply having a lot of parts (structural differentiation) does not make something complex.
"Something must make the parts work together, and that is organization." While organization
can take many forms, at its core, organization is a set of constraints which limit the behavior of
the parts within a system. In human endeavors, organization is often imposed by institutional
rankings and organizational hierarchies which constrain individuals and allow a society to
emerge from its many parts (Tainter & Patzek, 2012).
As described by Moore (2009) and Tainter & Patzek (2012), early American anthropologists
including Alfred Kroeber, Julian Steward and John Peabody Harrington analyzed cultures by
"breaking them down into discrete customs or elements, such as the forms of descent
(matrilineal, etc), where a couple resides after marriage, types of houses or tools and various
kinds of cultural practices." Later archeologists, including Moore, considered this method of
comparing cultures oversimplified and flawed since it assumes various elements to be of equal
significance and neglects to consider distinctions in how similar elements are used differently
across cultures (Moore J. D., 2009).
Despite these shortcomings, Tainter points out that Julian Steward "realized that culture
element lists were a crude way to begin to compare societies on a dimension of complexity."
(Tainter & Patzek, 2012) Tainter's first example of how structural differentiation and
organization must both be present in order for complexity to emerge is a military one from
World War II compiled by Steward: In order to execute the Allied landings on the North African
coast, the U.S. military transported 500,000 parts along with their landing forces. This large
number of parts is in contrast to "3,000 to 6,000 cultural elements documented among the native
people of western North America..." However, because the supplies were packed haphazardly
and mostly ended up uselessly dumped on the beach, Tainter concludes that the parts failed to
coalesce into a complex, functional system. "Differentiation, in structure without corresponding
organization makes a system complicated, not complex." (Tainter & Patzek, 2012)
Tainter's second example illustrates how "organization alone cannot make a system
complex." During the opening ceremony of the 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing, one "display
showed a sea of drummers, each dressed identically, all drumming in unison. It was most
impressive... But it was not a complex system. Although organization was high, (everyone
performed as required), there was no structural differentiation at all." (Tainter & Patzek, 2012)
While Tainter understandably focuses on complexity at the societal level in support of his
societal collapse theory, his definition is also applicable at the organizational level. For example,
a small entrepreneurial start-up is a much less complex organizational entity than a large
corporation or government agency. A start-up will likely only have a few employees; each
simultaneously serving in multiple roles. Specificity in roles is limited with each person covering
multiple tasks. The amount of hierarchy present in such a firm is also likely to be
correspondingly low. In contrast, a multi-national corporation has a very large number of
employees, each employed in a very specific role. Employees of a large corporation or
government agency also tend to operate within a strict hierarchy that clearly delineates their level
of responsibility and authority.
1.3 Empirical Observations Regarding Enterprise Improvement Efforts
Anyone who has worked with or within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise would
undoubtedly agree that it is a complex system and that complexity can be an impediment to
successful mission accomplishment. Over the past two decades, those working within the Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise have witnessed many efforts to improve performance of the
acquisition system. These efforts have included re-engineering, balanced scorecard, system
metrics tracking, Air Force Smart Operations 21 as well as multiple efficiency initiatives and
reorganizations driven by the Department of Defense or the Air Force.
Having personally witnessed a number of these efforts fall short of producing the expected
level of improvement, I have empirically developed opinions on why they have been less than
successful.
Performance is measured in two ways that are often in tension.
The first way performance of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is measured is how
well it does delivering capabilities to the operational Air Force. This is the conventional
definition and is measured in terms of cost, schedule and performance with performance
denoting meeting or exceeding requirements.
The second way performance of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is measured
deals with how closely the process is in compliance with the laws, regulations and policies
governing acquisition. It is in this area where most of the complexity resides. A great deal of the
work performed by members of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is expended to
ensure the level of performance in this regard is kept high. Compliance is enforced through
functional professionalism and expertise, approval processes and inspections. These activities
have a cost, both in terms of resources and time.
The underlying complexity of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is largely
unaffected by top-level changes
Past efforts to improve the system have strived to improve cost, schedule and delivered
system performance yet were limited in what they are able to alter in terms of underlying
complexity. The laws, regulations and policies are established at higher levels of authority within
the defense acquisition system and are not affected by organizational changes accomplished at
the local level.
Attempts to solve problems add more complexity
Problem solving within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise often results in
additional complexity. Once a problem is encountered, there is a strong culture and desire to
institute safeguards to prevent a reoccurrence of the same or similar problem. There is also a
desire to preserve the lessons learned in the course of solving the original issue. Both of these
often generate additional complexity in the form of new regulations and policies. This
phenomenon occurs at all levels within the enterprise, sometimes with conflicting results.
One's role in the enterprise exerts a powerful influence of what is perceived to be important
The common phrase "where you stand depends on where you sit" holds true within the Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. This is true across both hierarchical and functional
perspectives. Differing levels of authority within the system can have very different goals. For
instance, the Congress may view jobs associated with defense work as extremely important while
individual program managers and contracting officers worry little about this aspect of the
acquisition enterprise.
Different career fields also have different values. Contracting officers diligently safeguard
the authority vested in them in the form of warrants. This is often manifested in a more risk-
adverse perspective. Thoroughness, compliance, cost savings and attention to detail are looked
upon very favorably within the contracting functional profession. Program schedules tend not to
be viewed as importantly.
In contrast, program managers are rewarded for obligating funding and meeting
cost/schedule/delivered performance goals. Program managers therefore tend to adopt a more
risk-seeking perspective with regards to accomplishing contract actions and sometimes become
frustrated when contracting details slow agreement.
These differences in perspective can lead to different interpretations on how improvement
initiatives are to be implemented, further reducing their efficacy.
Improvement initiatives focus on organizational structure
Since much of the complexity within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise stems from
higher levels within the defense acquisition system, local efforts to improve performance tend to
focus on organizational structure. While changes in organizational structure can generate
performance improvement, they can also be largely ineffective if the underlying processes and
level of complexity remain the same.
While working within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise I was often perplexed by
efforts undertaken by leadership to improve performance. Each effort seemed very similar in
nature to the initiatives that had come before it. Most also seemed overly focused on
organizational structure, cyclically strengthening or weakening functional power relative to
program leadership.
During each assignment, I also encountered a deep level of cynicism across the workforce
concerning reform initiatives and the ability of the acquisition system to improve.
Upon reading Tainter's theory concerning societal collapse and its precursors, I was struck
by the similarities between his examples and my experience within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. In this thesis, I aspire to delve further into the impact of system
complexity on the performance of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise and its
implications for improving enterprise performance.
1.4 Thesis Overview
1.4.1 Chapter 2 Overview
Chapter 2 provides a review of theories that attempt to explain why organizations collapse.
Tainter's general theory is explained. Other theories focusing on societal collapse are also
reviewed and compared with Tainter's theory. Theories that attempt to explain why collapse
occurs at the organizational level are also examined. Societal level theories are found to be more
useful for analyzing the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
1.4.2 Chapter 3 Overview
Chapter 3 focuses on Tainter's theory of collapse. The framework of the theory is explained
and its applicability at the societal level is explored. The chapter reviews the four primary
societal level processes Tainter uses within his framework including agriculture and resource
production, information processing, sociopolitical control/specialization and overall economic
production. Each area is reviewed and the lessons that also apply at the organizational level are
highlighted.
1.4.3 Chapter 4 Overview
In chapter 4, the concepts of diseconomy of scale, incentives and organizational structure are
discussed. Each of these concepts provides insight into why it becomes difficult to manage an
organization or program effectively as it grows in size and complexity. Knowledge of these
concepts helps one to understand the challenges the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
faces while striving to operate effectively and efficiently.
1.4.4 Chapter 5 Overview
Chapter 5 consists of a top-level stakeholder analysis of the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise. Prior to applying Tainter's theory of collapse to the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise, it is helpful to understand who the primary stakeholders are and how they interact
within the enterprise. The analysis included identification of the key stakeholders, a review of
their responsibilities and a listing of the value each stakeholder group extracts and delivers from
the enterprise.
1.4.5 Chapter 6 Overview
Chapter 6 describes the research methodologies used. Sources of archival records are
described. The structure of surveys and interviews are discussed. Lastly, insight into the choice
of the specialty metal case study is provided.
1.4.6 Chapter 7 Overview
Chapter 7 establishes that there is a high level of complexity within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. This is a crucial first step in applying Tainter's theory at the enterprise
level. Evidence of complexity was gathered across three primary process areas: personnel
specialization/organizational structure, resource management, and regulatory guidance/policies.
1.4.7 Chapter 8 Overview
With it established that the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is a highly complex
organization, chapter 8 takes the next step and provides evidence that the level of complexity has
reached a point of diminishing marginal returns. Examples are presented where the interplay
between benefits and costs demonstrate declining marginal returns.
1.4.8 Chapter 9 Overview
Chapter 9 examines the responses senior leaders have taken to improve the performance of
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise in the face of high complexity and diminishing
marginal returns. These responses have included both cyclical reorganizations and senior leader
initiatives. Tainter's theory is used to explain why these improvement efforts have failed to meet
their objectives over the long term. Additionally, the chapter describes workarounds used by
stakeholders in attempts to increase productivity as predicted by Tainter's theory. Survey
responses are shown to also be congruent with Tainter's theory of collapse.
1.4.9 Chapter 10 Overview
Chapter 10 provides a summary of the research supported conclusions. The Air Force
aircraft acquisition enterprise is a highly complex organization that is at a point where that
complexity has resulted in diminished marginal returns. Senior leader responses in the form of
reorganizations and initiatives have been ineffectual since they have not reduced the level of
complexity within the enterprise. In the face of high complexity and diminished marginal
returns, both organizations and individuals within the enterprise utilize workarounds in an
attempt to increase marginal returns.
1.4.10 Chapter 11 Overview
Chapter 11 discusses the implications of the above research for both senior leaders within
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise and powerful external stakeholders such as the
Congress. Recommendations are also provided to both stakeholder groups including what to do
if a collapse of the enterprise occurs. In conclusion, Tainter's theory provides senior leaders with
an explanation why past reform efforts have fallen short of their objectives. The theory also
provides leaders with the guiding principle for subsequent reform attempts to improve
effectiveness: they should significantly reduce enterprise complexity.
Chapter 2 Theories of Collapse
2.1 Joseph Tainter: A General Theory of Collapse
A general theory on societal collapse was put forward in 1988 by the anthropologist Joseph
Tainter in his book The Collapse of Complex Societies. His theory, applied at an organizational
rather than societal level, provides the framework for examining the workings of the Air Force
aircraft acquisition enterprise.
Tainter suggests that societies become susceptible to collapse when "continued investment
in complexity as a problem-solving strategy yields a declining marginal return." (Tainter, 1988)
Depending on the type of stress placed upon a society, Tainter asserts that the society will
respond by making ever larger investments in "agricultural and other resource production, in
hierarchy, in information processing, in education and specialized training, in defense, and so
forth." Maintaining all of this complexity requires a significant "energy subsidy" and that when
the "declining marginal returns" gained from adding complexity are less than the investments
necessary to maintain them, the society may collapse to a form with a lower level of complexity
(Tainter, 1988).
Tainter uses the diagram provided as Figure 1 to describe how increasing complexity
increases the likelihood of collapse. Initially, as the level of complexity in a society is increased,
the marginal benefits also increase up to the point labeled (B1,C1). Once that point is reached,
"benefits still rise in response to increasing complexity, but at a declining marginal rate" up to
the point (B2,C2) (Tainter, 1988). He also asserts that within the area between these two points,
"collapse becomes increasingly likely." However, the region of most interest is the region
between points (B2,C2) and (B 1,C3) where a rise in complexity actually results in a decreasing
level of benefit. Because the benefit received at point (B 1,C3) is the same as what is produced
with less complexity at (B1,C1), the society is in "serious danger of collapse from decomposition
(as well as from any external threat)," once "constituent social units recognize that a strategy of
severing their ties to the regional entity might yield highly increased marginal productivity..."
(Tainter, 1988)
C1C2 C3Lwei of Co'ple4ty
Figure 1: The marginal product of increasing complexity (Tainter, 1988)
Upon reading Tainter's book, it is apparent that his theory is applicable at the organizational
level as well as at the societal level. By viewing the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
through the lens of Tainter's theory and what it portends are precursors to collapse, one gains
valuable insight into why efforts, including multiple reorganizations and senior leader initiatives
spanning the past 20 years, continue to under deliver. Tainter's theory prompts one to consider
whether the level of complexity within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is
appropriate. It also induces one to consider how people with the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise solve problems and whether those responses are congruent with what Tainter's theory
postulates about the tendency to continually add additional complexity.
Before delving further into Tainter's theory and its implications for the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise, it is important to review the range of other theories that seek to explain the
collapse of human endeavors and their applicability. One way to characterize collapse theories is
by what level of organizational failure they seek to explain. Predominantly, theories can be
categorized into one of two sets: those that attempt to explain failure at the broad societal or
governmental level and those theories that focus on explaining failure at the corporate or
organizational level.
2.2 Societal Level Theories
In order to prepare the way for his own theory, Tainter (1988) provides a succinct yet
comprehensive review of preceding theories that seek to explain collapse at the societal level and
why they fail to explain collapse as a "general phenomenon.. .not limited to specific cases, but
applicable across time, space, and type of society."
Tainter's review organizes previous societal/governmental theories into eleven major themes
as shown below. After outlining the leading theories within each theme and why they fall short,
he concludes that while mystical explanations, "are without scientific merit", each of the other
themes is "simply inadequate as presently formulated" due to the fact that they each fail to
provide a generalized universal explanation that cuts across all examples of societal collapse
(Tainter, 1988).
1. Resource depletion. Dealing with resource uncertainties is a common activity of
complex societies, and may be one of the things that they do best. Where this is not the case,
research has to focus on the characteristics of the society that prevent an appropriate
response, rather than exclusively on the characteristics of the depleted resource.
2. New resources. This theme has some attraction to integration theorists, but none to
conflict theorists'. Its usefulness is mainly restricted to simpler societies.
3. Catastrophes. Complex societies regularly provide for catastrophes, and routinely
experience them without collapsing. If the society cannot absorb a catastrophe, then in many
cases the characteristics of the society will be of greater interest, obviating the catastrophe
explanation.
4. Insufficient response to circumstances. The assumptions made in this theme about the
nature of complex societies - that they are inherently fragile, or static, or incapable of
shifting directions - simply cannot be supported. Where complex societies may display such
characteristics, that is a matter to be explained.
5. Other complex societies. Major cases, such as the Roman one, cannot be accounted for
by this theme. Conflict between states more often leads to cycle of expansion and
contraction than to collapse.
6. Intruders. The overthrow of a dominant state by a weaker one is an event to be
explained, not an explanation in itself. Empirically, intruders are often difficult to detect
archaeologically where they have been postulated. It is difficult to understand why
barbarians would destroy a civilization if it was worth invading in the first place.
7. Conflict/contradictions/mismanagement. The capacity to control labor and allocate
resources is intrinsic and necessary in complex societies. Collapse cannot easily be
explained by factors so vital to survival, at least not without raising many more questions
than are answered. Elite mismanagement and self-aggrandizement, to the extent that these
are detrimental to the survival of a society, are matters to be explained. Exploitation and
misadministration are normal, regular aspects of complex societies, and by themselves
cannot account for an occasional event, collapse. Peasants rarely revolt except when allied
with other social strata, and their rebellions are not typically aimed at collapse.
I Tainter (1988) defines integration theorists as those that "argue that complexity and stratification [within
societies] arose because of stresses impinging on human populations, and were positive responses to those stresses."
He conversely defines conflict theorists as those that "assert that the state emerged out of the needs and desires of
individuals and subgroups of society... as coercive mechanisms to resolve intra-societal conflicts arising out of
economic stratification."
8. Social dysfunction. These explanations offer neither sources of strain nor causal
mechanisms that can be analyzed in any objective way.
9. Mystical. Mystical explanations fail totally to account scientifically for collapse. They
are crippled by reliance on a biological growth analogy, by value judgments, and by
explanation by reference to intangibles.
10. Chance concatenation of events. This theme provides no basis for generalization.
Collapse is not well explained by reference to random factors.
11. Economic explanations. These are structurally and logically superior to the others, at
least as these others have been formulated to date. They identify characteristics of societies
that make them liable to collapse, specify controlling mechanisms, and indicate causal
chains between controlling mechanisms and observed outcome. While economic
explanations are not universally accepted in the social and historical sciences, such scenarios
remedy the logical deficiencies of the other approaches. Existing economic models often
suffer from incomplete forays into political and social explanations, but this is not an
'intrinsic' flaw. The major drawback to economic explanations, for present purposes, is
failure to develop an explanatory framework that is globally applicable. (Tainter, 1988)
Since the publication of Tainter's theory, a number of additional theories on societal
collapse have been put forward. The most commonly known one is articulated by Jared Diamond
in his 2005 book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. In the preface, Diamond
states that a more complete description of his book would be "Societal collapse involving an
environmental component, and in some cases also contributions of climate change, hostile
neighbors, and trade partners, plus questions of societal responses." (Diamond, 2005) Examining
Diamond's theory in the context of Tainter's eleven themes, one finds that it fits within the
resource depletion theme.
Diamond argues that collapse at the societal level primarily occurs due to the interplay of
factors within a "five-point framework" (Diamond, 2005). This framework consists of five sets
of factors that determine whether a society will persist or collapse: environmental damage,
climate change, hostile neighbors, decreased support by friendly neighbors, and the society's
response to its environmental problems. The reduction or elimination of essential resources due
to excessive consumption or climate change (resource depletion) place a society in a tenuous
position. Increased pressure or failure to properly handle a crisis in any of the other five factors
can then potentially serve as a trigger for societal collapse. Diamond's primary case study is the
case of Easter Island where he asserts that population growth and political rivalries resulted in
deforestation which became the environmental trigger for collapse. While Diamond makes a
compelling argument on the detrimental effects of resource depletion and how it can lead to
collapse at the societal level, his singular focus on environmental depletion prevents application
of his theory to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
A climate-centric theory of collapse was articulated by Harvey Weiss and Raymond Bradley
in their 2001 Science article "What Drives Societal Collapse?" After examining "high-resolution
paleoclimatic data that provide an independent measure of timing, amplitude, and duration of
past climate events", they conclude that disruptive climate changes are the primary precursor to
societal collapses (Weiss & Bradley, 2001). Within Tainter's taxonomy, this theory would also
fall within the resource depletion theme since it postulates that collapse is due to a "rapid loss of
resources due to an environmental fluctuation or climatic shift." As with Diamond's theory, this
focus on climatic precursors also renders Weiss' and Raymond's theory inapplicable to
understanding the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
Another theory advanced since Tainter's work straddles the resource depletion and
economic themes. John Greer in his paper How Civilizations Fail: A Theory of Catabolic
Collapse models society as a set of "relationships among resources, capital, waste, and
production" (Greer, 2005). As a society expands, its stock of capital assets increases. This
existing capital requires an increasing amount of resources to cover maintenance costs, averting
the conversion of assets to waste.
As long as resources are abundant, Greer argues that a society will oscillate between higher
and lower levels of capital as maintenance costs become unbearable and established capital is
laid to waste. As this occurs, maintenance costs fall, freeing resources for use in the production
of new capital and the cycle continues. This line of thinking is very much aligned with Tainter's
concept of higher levels of complexity resulting in diminishing marginal returns.
However, Greer points out that when resource use exceeds its replenishment rate, production
of new capital is hindered. Subsequent decreases in maintenance costs do not occur quickly
enough to provide a sufficient supply of resources for new capital production. Both factors then
continue to decrease in a downward spiral fashion. "Catabolic" collapse occurs when new capital
production approaches zero while remaining maintenance costs continue to convert existing
capital to waste. This unavailability of fresh resources for continued production and maintenance
activities is what generates and accelerates collapse in Greer's model. Greer argues that his
theory is an improvement on Tainter's since it better explains the "temporal nature" of societal
collapse and why the aftermath of collapse frequently results in a lower level of complexity than
what existed prior to the development of the society (Greer, 2005).
Greer cites the western Roman Empire as an example where a catabolic collapse occurred
"driven by a combined maintenance and resource crisis." (Greer, 2005) He points out that
Roman expansion and military superiority "transformed the capital of other societies into
resources for Rome" as each neighboring land was conquered. While each new conquest initially
provided resources for Roman use, each also came with longer term maintenance costs such as
enforcing Roman rule. However, as the rate of conquest slowed and became less profitable, "the
maintenance costs of empire proved unsustainable". Since these maintenance costs did not
decline as fast as the drop in production of new capital and resources, a cycle of "catabolic"
collapse continued until the empire completely disintegrated leaving an aftermath well below
what existed before the empire's expansion began.
Greer's model is for the most part a derivative of Tainter's theory focused on macro-level
capital creation and maintenance costs. Greer's concept of maintenance costs is very interesting
and is congruent with Tainter's theory. As a multi-layered distributed organization that requires
significant resources in terms of manpower and infrastructure, maintenance costs are an
important consideration when examining the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Entire
entities such as the Defense Acquisition University have been created to train and support the
acquisition workforce. While undoubtedly of value, they also consume significant resources.
Such large investments in overhead decrease the net amount of value gained through operation of
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise and hasten the onset of diminishing returns.
At the same time that Tainter was publishing his theory of collapse, a group of physicists,
including Per Bak, discovered the fractal-based concept of self-organized criticality (SOC)
explained "why so many physical patterns repeat in a generic way no matter what the spatial or
time scale" (Brunk, 2002). The example initially used by Bak to explain SOC was a pile of sand.
"As each new grain of sand is dropped on the pile, it tends to find a resting place that does not
disturb the others. In other words, the pile self-organizes, and in so doing creates an increasingly
complex structure as its height grows... .Eventually the grains of sand become so hypersensitive
to even the smallest of shocks that dropping another grain causes part of a sandpile - or, more
rarely, the entire pile to collapse." (Brunk, 2002) These collapses are often referred to as
"complexity cascades."
In 2002, based upon the "recognition that SOC produces a basic pattern that is also
ubiquitous in biological and human systems", George Brunk articulated a new general theory of
why societies collapse. Congruent with Tainter's theory, Brunk (2002) asserts that:
"human systems are naturally self-organizing in that societies always tend to evolve
toward the maximum level of complexity that is possible given current technological
constraints. As they approach this limit, they experience increasingly rigidities and suffer
more problems of various sorts."
Rather than return to the sandpile example, Brunk subsequently relies on an example based
on the pattern of wildfires to help explain how SOC pertains to collapse. Wild fires are typically
started by an external event such as a lightning strike or a carelessly discarded cigarette. The
magnitude of the resulting fire is not dependent on the size of the ignition source but rather is
dependent on the amount of fuel in the form of forest growth or prairie scrub brush that has built
up over time. This build-up is described as analogous to the amount of complexity present within
a system. Brunk asserts that if external events are allowed to impact the system regularly, the
level of complexity within the system is periodically lowered which "reduces the number of very
large [complexity] cascades." Brunk then translates this model into the societal realm asserting
that collapses are rare because "governments or private organizations take actions to minimize
the effect of SOC complexity cascades by dampening them." This ability to dampen the negative
effects of shocks and prevent complexity cascades ranging from floods (levies) to bank runs
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) is "the fundamental reason that civilization has
advanced..." (Brunk, 2002)
While Brunk credits the ability to dampen shocks as fundamental to the progress of society,
he is clear that such actions do not prevent collapse indefinitely. "Ironically, instead of
eliminating all complexity cascades, what the increasing bureaucratization of mature societies
may do is increase the impact of the really big cascades when they overwhelm a society's
barricades." He again returns to the wildfire analogy pointing out that:
A recent example of the unintentional magnification of complexity cascades through
well-intended bureaucratic behavior is the wildfires that have swept the American West.
Their sizes were greatly increased by the US Forest Service's long-standing policy of
immediately extinguishing fires. By not allowing small wildfires to burn freely every few
years, the complexity of the western forest systems was greatly increased in terms of ability
of wildfires to spread, and so too was the magnitude of the inevitable disasters that occurred
at the turn of the millennium. (Brunk, 2002)
While Brunk's theory is very compelling due to its roots in physical science and its
descriptive power, its reliance on "aggregate-level patterns" to explain collapse makes it difficult
to use in a predictive manner. In fact, Brunk asserts that to try and do so would not be fruitful
since "[complexity cascades] are unanticipated and catch people by surprise." He further goes on
to challenge Tainter and others that have articulated a reduction in societal complexity as a way
to stave off collapse:
Even temporarily reducing a society's level of complexity will not permanently rid its
inhabitants of the evils of periodic cascades. This is because human systems are constantly
self-organizing toward a greater level of complexity, which brings with it unanticipated
problems. In doing so they all seem to follow the same generic evolutionary path of
expansion and sudden setbacks. (Brunk, 2002)
Even if Brunk's conjecture is correct and the collapse of all human endeavors is inevitable in
the long run, all is not lost. If addressing complexity and the precursors of collapse can improve
system performance and perhaps defer a catastrophe, it is worthwhile to rely on Tainter's theory
for guidance.
2.3 Organizational Level Theories
Since the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is a governmental entity similar in size to
a very large corporation, it is important to review theories that focus on explaining collapse at the
corporate/organizational level for applicability.
In 1976, John Argenti, in his book Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms, became
one of the first to systematically study why firms collapse in the hope that such an understanding
would lead to "some way of preventing their collapse..." Similar to Tainter's approach, Argenti
first presents a synopsis of causes and symptoms that were put forward by his predecessors in the
process of explaining individual cases of corporate collapse. Based on these individual cases, he
reduces the causes and symptoms into a list of 12 items which he then links into a generalized
descriptive narrative of corporate collapse that he asserts describes all corporate failures:
If the management of a company is poor then two things will be neglected: the system
of accountancy information will be deficient and the company will not respond to change.
(Some companies, even well-managed ones, will be damaged because powerful constraints
prevent the mangers making the responses they wish to make.) Poor managers will also
make at least one of three other mistakes: They will overtrade; or they will launch a big
project that goes wrong; or they will allow the company's [leverage] to rise so that even
normal business hazards become constant threats. These are the chief causes, neither fraud
nor bad luck deserve more than a passing mention. The following symptoms will appear:
28
certain financial ratios will deteriorate but, as soon as they do, the managers will start
creative accounting which reduces the predictive value of these ratios and so lends greater
importance to non-financial symptoms. Finally, the company enters a characteristic period
in the last few months. (Argenti, 1976)
In addition to his narrative of corporate collapse, Argenti asserts that this narrative manifests
itself along three typical paths which he calls trajectories. As shown in Figure 2, each of the
trajectories describes a type of corporate collapse "marked by a different combination of the
causes and symptoms..." Type 1 failures are the province of newly formed, small firms. "The
general health of the company probably never rises above 'poor' and it probably fails within five
years." (Argenti, 1976) A Type 2 collapse trajectory is also exhibited by small firms with the
difference in development attributed to a leader who is a "super-salesman". The charismatic
CEO is able to achieve a "swift take-off' and attract a great deal of interest in the form of capital
and media attention. Inevitably, the lack of actual performance catches up to the firm and it
rapidly collapses. Lastly, Type 3 failures "occur only to mature companies which have been
trading successfully for a number of years or decades." (Argenti, 1976) This trajectory is
characterized by "an initial collapse, a plateau, [and] a final collapse." The initial collapse is
caused by a combination of Argenti's 12 causes and symptoms which cause the firm to be
injured in the face of an otherwise "normal business hazard." This drives the firm to become
even more over leveraged and engage in creative accounting. This behavior keeps the firm stable
for some time until once again, it is confronted with a hazard. Only this time, it is "waterlogged"






1-a ,11 hr tyeTso 3
rwrr
Yea"s
Figure 2: Three Types of Failure Trajectories (Argenti, 1976)
Between the two primary components of Argenti's theory of why corporate collapse occurs,
the narrative of causes and symptoms is the most useful in the context of the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. However, while the causes of poor management, failure to change and the
undertaking of a large project each have impacted organizations within the public sector, the
concept of commercial failure does not apply as it does in a private sector firm. An example of
this difference is the massive road construction project that was undertaken in Boston known as
the "Big Dig". While plagued by accusations of poor planning and management as well as
overruns that drove the final cost from a planned $2.6B to more than $14.8B, the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority did not collapse (The Associated Press, 2007). The Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise has also experienced large cost overruns in its projects that would have
likely been fatal for a commercial firm dependent on investor capital. One example is the F-22
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procurement where the unit cost per aircraft rose from a 1992 estimate of $125.2M to a $361.3M
in 2004 due to increased development costs and reduced procurement quantities (U.S. GAO,
2006).
Since Argenti's book, research on predicting corporate failure via an analysis of financial
ratios has continued. A good example of this type of research is a paper which asserts that the
stability of financial ratios over time is a strong predictor of whether a firm will collapse
(Dambolena & Khoury, 1980). Being dependent on the analysis of accounting ratios, these
theories and models have no applicability to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
Building upon previous qualitative and anecdotal work such Argenti (1976), another
perspective on large corporate failure was put forward by Donald Hambrick and Richard
D'Aveni in 1988. They relied on conclusions drawn from previous work on corporate collapse to
converge upon four "major constructs" which they then used to assess 57 large firms that
declared bankruptcy between 1972 and 1982. The constructs selected were domain initiative,
environmental carrying capacity, slack and performance. Analysis relied on statistical evaluation
of variables within each of the four construct categories as well as qualitative case studies. After
examining the 57 bankrupt firms and matched surviving firms, Hambrick and D'Aveni conclude
that the collapse of large firms is a "protracted process of decline" in the form of a downward
spiral consisting of four phases (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988). The first two stages are defined as
"origins of disadvantage" and "early impairment" both of which put the firm on the path towards
collapse. In the first stage, lagging levels of slack and performance relative to competitor firms
are the first signs of weakness. In the second stage, slack and profitability fall to marginal levels
which lead to the spiral down in the final two stages. As shown in Figure 3, what occurs during
the final two stages of the spiral seals a firm's fate:
Firms enter the marginal existence stage with deficient potential slack and performance.
These problems create stress, which in turn induces perceptual and process errors. The most
apparent manifestations are extreme strategic behaviors (inaction or hyperaction) and wide
vacillation in those behaviors. At the same time, some favorable conditions exist, notably
satisfactory levels of working capital and a neutral or even munificent environment.
Unfortunately, these positive signs merely provide false encouragement to decision makers,
thus providing yet another basis for extreme behaviors... leaving the firm in a continued
marginal state.
In the death struggle, stress-induced perceptual errors are thought to intensify, still
manifested as strategic extremism and vacillation. The penalties from these behaviors,
coupled with a sudden decline in the environment's carrying capacity, exhaust all forms of
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Figure 3: Elaboration of the last two stages of large firm failure (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988)
At its core, Hambrick and D'Aveni's theory is centered on the themes of mismanagement
and resource depletion. In the final stages, mismanagement and false perceptions lead to fatal
levels of strategic extremism and vacillation between bold initiatives and inaction. These ill-
advised policy swings deplete the firm's resources and failure inevitably ensues.
The Hambrick and D'Aveni study is descriptive of the large firm death spiral experience.
However little insight is provided concerning the mechanisms of resource depletion caused by
strategic extremism. In particular, there is no discussion of what role complexity plays in the
process. However, a valuable take away from their study is the empirical "central finding" that
weakness appears early. A "substantial period of warning" coupled with a long process of failure
affords management the opportunity to halt the downward spiral and avert collapse.
Inherent in the Hambrick and D'Aveni study is the notion of competition between firms
with the weaker one succumbing to collapse. James Utterback, in his book Mastering the
Dynamics ofInnovation examines the nature of competition between firms and the role of
innovation in success or failure. He proposes a model of the dynamics that occur when a new
innovation is introduced. The rate of innovation surrounding the new industry is shown below as
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The Dynamics of Innovation (Utterback, 1994)
In the fluid phase, the innovation is manifested in a number of "diverse" product designs
offered by a rapidly growing number of competing firms. In the transitional phase, a "dominant
design" emerges and the number of firms able to effectively compete declines quickly.
Competition moves from product innovation to process innovation where the "competitive
emphasis in this phase is on producing products for more specific users as the needs of those
users become more clearly understood." (Utterback, 1994)
As an industry based on a particular technology matures, it enters the specific phase where
"the value ratio of quality to cost becomes the basis of competition." Firms that have been unable
to compete in the process realm have departed or failed. Only a few firms remain; engaged in a
"classic oligopoly with stable market shares." (Utterback, 1994)
Within the Utterback model of an industry built upon an innovation, firms fail when they do
not effectively make the transition from one phase to the next. Collapse is the result of a failure
to adapt when the nature of the competition changes.
A Darwinian perspective on why businesses collapse is provided by Theodore Piepenbrock
and Charles Fine in an article synopsizing Piepenbrock's 2009 Ph.D. dissertation. As shown in
Figure 5 below, Piepenbrock asserts that all commercial enterprise architectures fall along a
"continuum spanning two polar opposites" based upon three criteria: objective function of the
firm, enterprise boundaries and stakeholder interfaces. On one end of the continuum is the
"Blue" modular enterprise architecture which seeks to only maximize shareholder value and is
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Fluid Phase
very tightly scoped in both terms of boundaries and depth of stakeholder relationships. On the
other end of the continuum is the "red" integral enterprise architecture which seeks to maximize
value across all stakeholders while maintaining broad boundaries and high quality interaction
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Figure 5: Enterprise architectures (Piepenbrock & Fine, 2009)
As the business environment in which firms complete against one another changes,
advantage is conveyed to either modular or integrally structured enterprises:
Enterprise architectures early in the industry's evolution are integral, for radical product
innovation. They then dis-integrate for speed to build a fast-growing market, and for greater
cost-leadership and more modest product innovation. As the ecosystem begins to mature,
integral enterprise architectures are required for radical process innovation (Piepenbrock &
Fine, 2009)
If an incumbent firm fails to adjust its structure in response to the changing environment it
will be unable to effectively compete and will potentially fail as shown below in Figure 6. With
an extremely effective analogy, Piepenbrock and Fine drive this point home: "In biology and
business, morphology trumps physiology - i.e. species type is more important than health of the
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Figure 6: Industry lifecycle (Piepenbrock & Fine, 2009)
While Piepenbrock's framework elegantly explains why a firm's architecture can play a
determining role in its long term success or demise, it is not very useful for examining the Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise for precursors of collapse. As a sub-unit of the Air Force, the
enterprise is shielded from many (though not all) aspects of competition. More importantly, the
growth of the Air Force acquisition "industry" is controlled via the Defense department's
budgeting process versus innovation and cost pressures generated by commercial market
demand.
Marwa and Zairi look for links "between causes of corporate collapse/demise and the
concept of quality." Their exploratory study finds there is a clear linkage between a firm's level
of commitment to the concept of quality and the likelihood of eventual corporate failure. The
implication of their work is that "corporations can only afford to ignore the concept of quality at
their own peril." (Marwa & Zairi, 2008) This result likely is the result of competing firms
utilizing quality-based measures to improve their competitive position. Firms that do not make
such improvements will tend to lag behind and fail more frequently.
Lessons and techniques borrowed from the commercial world have been instrumental in
improving the performance of government organizations such as the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. However, because of the very different motivations behind the operation
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of firms and government agencies, theories of collapse from the corporate world are for the most
part not very applicable. Financial ratios are not kept and the nature of competition between
entities is based upon budget and prestige vs. profit and share price.
Among both societal and corporate enterprise level explanations of collapse, Tainter's
theory, based on marginal productivity, is the most applicable. By viewing the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise through the lens of Tainter's theory and what it portends are precursors to
collapse, valuable insight is gained into why the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
continues to resist improvement in performance despite the multiple reorganizations and senior
leader initiatives that have occurred over the past two decades.
Chapter 3 Tainter's Framework
While the previous chapter provided a review of collapse theories, this chapter focuses on
Tainter's theory of collapse. The framework of the theory is explained and its applicability at the
societal level is explored. In order to advance his theory of collapse and its reliance on the
concept of changing cost/benefit ratios for a given investment in complexity, Tainter focuses on
the behavior of four primary societal level processes. They are agriculture and resource
production, information processing, sociopolitical control/specialization and overall economic
production. The complexity of these processes varies from the very simple to highly complex
depending on the society and time frame being examined (Tainter, 1988). Each area is reviewed
and the lessons that also apply at the organizational level are highlighted.
3.1 Societal Level Processes
3.1.1 Agriculture and Resource Production
The first societal level process Tainter points to as evidence of declining marginal retums in
the face of higher complexity is agriculture and resource production. He cites a number of papers
from the 1960s and 1970s that show "that marginal returns on agriculture, in a subsistence
economy, decline with increasing labor."
The simplest form of agriculture is commonly known as "slash and bum". In this type of
farming, the forest is cleared and the resulting open space is exploited until the soil is depleted
and resulting crop yields plunge. When this occurs, farmers clear yet more land and the process
is repeated. In contrast, multi-cropping is a complex and intensive form of farming that produces
multiple harvests over one year from a single piece of land. Tainter references Boserup (1965)
who points out that "human labor per unit of agricultural output rises" as the intensity of farming
increases. This additional human labor is required to perform "increasing land preparation,
fertilization, and irrigation..." While population growth is often cited as the primary reason that
drives a society to undertake more complex forms of agriculture, Tainter points out that "it is not
necessary to accept the demographic-stress argument to grasp the point of immediate relevance.
This is that marginal returns on agriculture, in a subsistence economy, decline with increasing
labor." As shown in Figure 7 below, Tainter also reproduces a number of charts from Clark and
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Fig. 3. Marginal returns of agriculture (after Clark and Haswell1%66: 84) Reproduced by permission of
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Figure 7: Evidence of Declining Returns in Agriculture (Tainter, 1988)
Tainter concludes the section by pointing out that the same declining marginal returns can
be observed in both animal husbandry activities as well as energy and minerals production.
Tainter's overarching explanation for this pattern is:
Among whatever set of resources a population obtains, for whatever reasons, the law of
diminishing returns is likely to apply. As demand for a commodity grows, increased
production will at some point mean depletion or insufficiency of the least costly sources. At
that point, more costly sources must be used, with declining marginal returns." (Tainter,
1988)
3.1.2 Information Processing
Information processing is the next societal level process reviewed by Tainter for signs of
diminishing returns. Within this category he discusses a number of information intensive
activities including medical research and development as well as investments in education. As
with agriculture, Tainter shows that increasing levels of investment in each area have resulted in
declining marginal returns. In regards to examining the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise,
the key insight made by Tainter within this section is that in order to deal with increasing
information complexity, a society must expend resources to prepare people to perform
increasingly specialized roles. Tainter concludes that such highly specialized training yields
benefits that "may apply only to narrow segments of the society, while its costs are spread
throughout the system." (Tainter, 1988)
3.1.3 Hierarchical Specialization and Overall Economic Productivity
Next Tainter shifts from individual specialization to the growth of "hierarchical
specialization" which is a succinct way of describing the growth in administrative levels of
management within an organizational structure. While acknowledging Parkinson's (1955)
powerful arguments concerning the growth of self-serving governmental bureaucracies, Tainter
provides evidence that "a pattern of increasing hierarchical specialization characterizes the
private sector as strongly as Parkinson has demonstrated for the public." Rather than blaming
misaligned incentives, Tainter attributes the growth in hierarchy to complex organizations having
to allocate "ever larger portions of their personnel and other resources to administration...
because increased complexity requires greater quantities of information processing and greater
integration of disparate parts." (Tainter, 1988) As an organization puts in place administrative
solutions to solve problems, they tend to remain in place and become cumulative, reducing
marginal returns.
Lastly, Tainter looks at overall economic productivity and cites evidence that "complex
societies with large, well-developed economies have historically been able to sustain only rather
inferior rates of economic growth." He attributes this decline in growth rate to both diminishing
marginal returns in innovation and the need to expend resources to maintain existing
infrastructure and organizations rather than create new structures.
3.2 Societal Level Evaluation
Once Tainter describes the development of his model concerning the relationship between
increasing complexity and lower marginal returns, he evaluates the framework in a qualitative
manner across three cases of societal collapse. Tainter acknowledges that
The ideal way to evaluate this model would be to isolate and quantify the costs and
benefits of various instances of social complexity, and to plot changes in these costs and
benefits through time. Long-term periods of significant declining marginal returns in
complexity should be periods of vulnerability to collapse. (Tainter, 1988)
The problem Tainter has in doing so is none of his three ancient societal case studies "kept
the kinds of detailed records necessary for such a quantitative test." Therefore, Tainter chooses
instead to show that his framework helps explain collapse in each of the three cases which were
chosen to cover a wide range of sociopolitical complexity. His three case studies include the
collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the Classic Maya of the Southern Lowlands and the
Chocoan Society of the American Southwest.
3.2.1 The Western Roman Empire
In the case of the Western Roman Empire, Tainter focuses on two areas where the Empire
encountered diminishing marginal returns. The first is conquest. Tainter cites evidence that
shows that Rome established and maintained its empire using the spoils gained by dominating its
neighbors. He points out that initially, the returns from this strategy were "spectacularly high".
However, as the Empire became larger and larger, each successive conquest became less
profitable and was unable to cover the cost of maintaining the status quo including a large
standing army and provincial administration. Territory and peoples conquered earlier inevitably
transitioned from being sources of plundered wealth to being net consumers of resources due to
the costs of defense and administration. Citing Hammond (1946), Tainter points out that later
conquests such a Britain and Dacia "probably never paid for themselves, for these were poor,
distant, frontier provinces." (Tainter, 1988) The diminishing returns derived from conquest
forced the empire to rely on the taxation of yearly provincial output and the sale of capital in the
form of government owned lands and treasures.
The second instance of diminishing marginal returns Tainter discusses is the value of the
empire itself to its subjects. Initially, accepting Roman rule provided a high level of return in the
form of protection from adversaries and organizational structure in the form of a competent
governmental administration. However, as the empire and its bureaucracies grew, the empire
became increasingly reliant on its own internal populations for income (via taxation) yet
provided no additional benefits.
If accounts are to be believed, at least a portion of the overtaxed peasantry openly
welcomed the relief they thought the barbarians would bring from the burdens of Roman
rule. And a much larger portion were evidently apathetic to the impending collapse. It seems
clear that the Empire had at least partially lost its legitimacy. The costs of empire had risen
dramatically, while in the face of barbarian successes the protection that the State could
offer to many of its citizens proved increasingly ineffectual. To many, there were simply no
remaining benefits to the Empire, as both barbarians and tax collectors crossed and ravaged
their lands. (Tainter, 1988)
The case of the Roman empire provides two insights concerning diminishing marginal
returns and organizations. The first is that organizations should be cautious concerning increases
in size and complexity that are funded by windfalls. If unheeded, organizations may find
themselves underresourced under steady state conditions and prone to a collapse.
The second insight is that an organization's survival is dependent on the willing
participation of its members. If people perceive that the costs of participation outweigh the
returns, they will cease to participate and will withdraw support from the organization. In the
case of the Roman Empire, Tainter argues that both of these eventualities doomed the Empire to
collapse. It could not maintain its size and level of complexity in a resource constrained steady-
state environment without putting undue pressure on its populace who eventually withdrew their
support.
3.2.2 Classic Maya Civilization
In the case of the Mayans, Tainter argues that sociopolitical complexity increased in
response to a need for security. Since most of Southern Mayan territory was environmentally
similar, there was little diversification between agricultural outcomes across the region. This
homogeneity did not allow for different communities within the greater society to trade with one
another to average out agricultural surpluses and failures. Instead, when crop failures occurred,
each population center tended to resort to conflict, seizing what was necessary for survival from
weaker, neighboring communities. This behavior put a complexity-increasing feedback loop into
motion where each Mayan community strove to demonstrate its relative strength in the form
monument construction and population size as a form of deterrence (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Mayan Complexity Spiral
As this reinforcing cycle continued, the increase in crop yields failed to keep up with what
was necessary to support the increasing size of the "elite hierarchies, military and civil
specialists, and an artisan class" as well as the underlying peasant population growth. In
congruence with Tainter's framework:
... the marginal return on this investment deteriorated over time. Ever increasing
investments in warfare, complexity, monumental construction, and agricultural
intensification yielded no proportionately increasing return in the health and nutritional
status of the populace. To the contrary, as the demands on the support population increased,
the benefits accruing to that population actually declined... Whether the final push was from
invaders, environmental deterioration, withdrawal of peasant support, internal conflict, or
some combination of these, the fact of the collapse is no surprise. It was a predictable
adjustment to an otherwise unsolvable dilemma. (Tainter, 1988)
The primary insight gained from reviewing the Mayan collapse is that leaders should be
wary of reinforcing feedback when increasing the level of complexity within their organizations.
If the marginal return on increased complexity is decreasing, continuing to add more is an
unsustainable plan for the future.
3.2.3 Chacoan Society of the San Juan Basin
Tainter's last case study focuses on the Chacoan society of the American Southwest. It was
a society that existed in what is now northwestern New Mexico. This ancient society has also
been referred to as the Anasazi and as the Ancient Pueblo People (Ambler, 1977). In contrast to
the Mayan case study, this society was built upon agricultural diversification. Since the society
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existed in an arid and generally inhospitable environment, it relied upon a network of "Great
Houses" which acted as administrators and trading centers linking different regions of the
society. As the society grew, the number of trading centers increased and expanded out from the
Chaco Canyon hub of the society. According to the sources cited by Tainter, these later great
houses were known as "Chacoan Outliers" or simply "Outliers". This hub and spoke structure
initially provided the society with a "valuable return on its investment in complexity by lowering
the administrative cost, and increasing the effectiveness, of an energy averaging system. Beyond
its initial establishment, however, further expansion of this system may not have been so
advantageous." (Tainter, 1988) As the number of Outliers grew, the distance between them
decreased and reduced each one's geographical span of control.
After enough Outliers had been established in the region to maximally exploit its
environmental diversity, the addition of each new one reduced the effectiveness of the
system... The overall effectiveness of the network deteriorated. The result was that later
Chacoan communities realized a proportionately lower advantage when some region
experienced a surplus, and proportionately less could be distributed to each community
experiencing a deficit. (Tainter, 1988).
Tainter asserts that this pattern ultimately set the stage for the society's collapse when a
"severe, prolonged drought" occurred from 1134-81 A.D. The network that had carried the
society through earlier droughts had become too inefficient and strained to withstand the shock.
"What the final drought may have accomplished was to change the curve of marginal return on
investment in complexity from a smoothly to a sharply declining one, and so to hasten the end."
Communities in the southern Basin region then effectively opted out of the system since they
"saw that opportunity and security lay elsewhere." (Tainter, 1988)
An interesting insight gained from the Chocoan collapse is that in the face of decreasing
system effectiveness, some participants will elect to withdraw if doing so boosts their own
marginal return. Organizational leaders should be mindful of this when deciding whether to
maintain or expand a system's complexity in the face of decreasing marginal returns. In order to
remain viable in the long term, a system must maintain a level of productivity that discourages
defection.
Chapter 4 Supporting Concepts: Diseconomy of Scale, Incentives and
Organizational Structure
In order to better understand the workings of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, it
is important to also grasp the concepts of diseconomy of scale, incentives and organizational
structure. Each of these concepts provides insight into the challenges the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise faces while striving to operate effectively and efficiently.
4.1 Diseconomy of Scale
As projects and organizations increase in size, both economies and diseconomies of scale
may occur. Economies of scale often result when "firms produce large quantities, the technology
and product design are stable, processes have been standardized, automation is effective and skill
levels of the workforce are steadily improving." (Valerdi, Friedman, & Marticello, 2011)
Within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, many of these factors do not apply.
Production quantities are small and the work is far from standardized. In such cases, as an
organization's or project's size increases, diseconomies of scale become evident and can limit
performance.
One way to avoid diseconomies of scale entirely is to remain small. George Friedman, a
former chief technical officer at Northrop Corporation, is a strong advocate for keeping project
design and build teams as small as feasibly possible. He points out that in its first decade of
existence, "no fewer than 14 new aircraft were conceived, designed, built, tested, produced and
delivered." According to Friedman, this was accomplished by centralizing the architecture of
each project and working with small, dedicated teams. Northrop "minimized the complexity of
the total effort by minimizing formality and the number of interactions." (Valerdi, Friedman, &
Marticello, 2011)
There are a number of theories on why diseconomies of scale appear. Before briefly
outlining them, it is insightful to understand the relationship between the scale of an
organization's operation and the costs encountered for it to operate.
It is necessary to recognize that a firm's expansion path does not remain linear as the
input proportions change. A firm enjoys economies of scale when it doubles its output for
less than twice the cost. Diseconomies of scale occur when doubling of output requires more
than twice the cost. In other words, cost-output elasticity Ec
|AC/C | AC/Lq _ Marginal Cost
SAq/ C/q Average Cost
i.e., the percent change in cost per the percent change in output. When Ec is greater than
1, there are diseconomies of scale.
Diseconomies of scale work to limit the size of endeavors. Canback (2002) observes: "If
diseconomies of scale do not exist, then we would presumably see much larger companies
than we do today. Why are there no corporations with several million employees? No
business organization in the United States has more than one million employees or more
than ten hierarchical levels." (Valerdi, Friedman, & Marticello, 2011)
4.1.1 Network Complexity Theory
One reason diseconomies of scale can emerge as an enterprise grows in size has to do with
what happens as the number of components in a system, people in an organization or nodes in a
network increases.
Brooks (1975) and Conte (1986) suggest that diseconomies occur in systems when the
number of interactions and interfaces in systems rise faster than the number of components.
At a minimum, the number of possible binary two-way interactions between n components or
subsystems is n(n-1), which certainly grows faster than the number of components or nodes.
Many researchers have pointed out that merely examining the binary interactions in complex
systems is insufficient. This is important since the primary way managers deal with
increasing scale and complexity is to introduce hierarchical modularity into systems and
organizations. (Baldwin, 2001) While these modules provide additional functionality, they
also increase the cost of operating the complete system or organization. Whitney points out
that these increasing costs are
...due to the need to test, and rises in proportion to the number of modules if the
behavioral influence of each on the whole system is easily seen, thus requiring no
additional tests beyond the module level. But the cost rises exponentially if the influence
of a module is hard to see, requiring every combination to be tested. (Whitney, 2003)
Whether or not every combination is tested to ensure a true understanding of system
operation, it is likely that the system "has sneak paths or emergent interconnections" which
will result in unintended influences between modules and levels within the hierarchy.
(Whitney, 2003) It is therefore expected that as a system or organizational network increases
in scale, these unaccounted interactions can place a large burden on the enterprise.
Employing the viewpoint of the power set-the set of all subsets of a set of n items, far more
complexity is revealed to be present than what is expected from binary relations alone.
Therefore, the complexity of the problem in the form of interactions grows as 2" rather than
approximately n2 - substantially faster. The sources of these additional interactions are often
unintended and unanticipated links between subsystems. (Valerdi, Friedman, & Marticello,
2011)
4.1.2 Emergence
The concept of emergence can also result in diseconomies of scale. Ackoff (2000) asserts for
a system to exist, it must have properties or behaviors that can only be generated by all of the
elements operating together. Fromm echoes this assertion in describing the concept of emergence
used in introductory text books on complex systems: "A property of a system is emergent, if it is
not a property of any fundamental element, and emergence is the appearance of emergent
properties and structures on a higher level of organization or complexity." (Fromm, 2005)
Simply put, emergence is what makes a system worth constructing. The value generated by the
system as a whole is greater than the value generated by the systems components acting
independently. However, emergent properties of a complex system or organization can also be of
an unintended and detrimental nature as well:
An example of detrimental emergence is the concept of bureaucratic insularity where
managers within a large organization become insulated from their subordinates and
shareholders. As a result of this insulation from accountability, a tendency to place personal
gain ahead of overall enterprise performance emerges. (Canback, 2002) This phenomenon
was directly observed [by George Friedman] during his service as an executive at Northrop
Corporation. The largest meeting rooms in the company were built to accommodate
government review teams-which often outnumbered the engineers actually working on the
reviewed program. John Moore commented:
It is necessary that the increasing levels of size and complexity require more personnel, but
there is a growing proliferation of activities by individuals who enjoy substantially above average
standards of living who contribute little or nothing to progress, and either interfere with the
productivity of others or live on their output, endlessly churning words, paper and contacts among
themselves. They are the unnecessary administrative personnel and activities which are required
to meet the demands imposed by excessive regulations and bureaucracies. (Moore J. )
Bureaucratic insularity and its detrimental effects can be amplified by the nature of the
organizational network. Gladwell speaks about a class of people known as connectors, who
have significantly larger social networks than average and therefore have the ability to exert
greater influence. (Gladwell, 2000) The presence of such individuals tends to result in a
network that more closely exhibits a scale-free nature where some nodes have many more
connections than others with the distribution following a power law. (Whitney, 2003) In
scale free networks, the influence of such high-connection nodes over the behavior of the
system can be extremely large and disproportionate. (Valerdi, Friedman, & Marticello, 2011)
4.2 Incentives
Grossi (2003) defines an enterprise's stakeholder as "any group or individual that directly or
indirectly affects or is affected by the level of achievement of an enterprise's value creation
process." Broadly, the list of primary stakeholders of an enterprise includes the owners and
managers of the enterprise as well as employees, customers and government regulators.
Performing a stakeholder analysis is a powerful way to reveal an enterprise's primary
stakeholders and aids in understanding their interests. These interests will incentivize
stakeholders to behave in ways that ultimately may or may not align with the goals of the
enterprise.
When the goals of the organization and its primary stakeholders are aligned, the actions that
stakeholders take in their own interest generally also benefit the organization as a whole.
Extensive research has been conducted in employment contracts and agency theory in an effort
to understand and shape the motivations and behaviors that occur amongst individuals within
organizations.
As discussed above, one negative phenomenon that can occur in large organizations is
bureaucratic insularity. This can result in a divergence between the goals of the organization and
the self-interest of managers who are insulated from accountability within a large organization.
In addition to being a potential diseconomy of scale, the way people are managed and
compensated within a large organization can result in a misalignment of incentives:
Rasmusen and Zenger point out "the costs of organizing rise with firm size because
larger firms are less efficient than smaller firms in offering contracts that induce high effort
and attract high-ability workers" (Zenger, 1990) Small firms tend to compensate employees
using incentive contracts that reward higher levels of performance with higher levels of
compensation. On the other hand, larger firms tend to rely on fixed-wage contracts and rely
on management to monitor individual and group performance. Rasmusen and Zenger go on
to conclude that smaller firms are able to extract higher levels of effort from their employees
than larger firms. (Zenger, 1990) This is congruent with what we have seen in actual
practice. As system development teams grow, productivity increases as the talents and
resources of the group are harnessed. However, as group size increases, diseconomies of
scale begin to surface in the form of freeloading and ineffective coordination and
communication. (Valerdi, Friedman, & Marticello, 2011)
Primary stakeholders who reside outside of an enterprise's organizational structure may
exercise significant power over an enterprise. They may control resources or approvals that are
necessary for an organization to successfully operate. Unfortunately, these external stakeholders
may be incentivized to behave in ways that run counter to the primary goals of the enterprise due
to competing interests.
Elected legislators are an example of a stakeholder with competing interests. Legislators
must balance the desires of those who elected them with other interests which include the
effective operation of government and adherence to their political party's ideology or
framework. After examining the voting records of the United States Senate from 1979 to 1980,
Sam Peltzman concluded that when dealing with issues of economic interest, the votes of
senators closely adhered to the desires of their electorate and contributors. Only when economic
benefits were less relevant did political party or ideology provide greater explanatory power
(Peltzman, 1981).
Incentives clearly drive behavior, both at the individual and group level. A stakeholder
analysis can be used to reveal the level of alignment between the interests of the enterprise and
those of its primary stakeholders.
4.3 Organizational Structure
There are primarily three ways to structure an enterprise whose primary purpose is to
manage projects. The first is the traditional hierarchical organization where each of the
underlying divisions is based upon a functional specialty. According to Youker (1977), the
strength of this structure lies in "its centralization of similar resources." This centralization helps
with the functional development of employees since all members of a division have training and
experience within the same functional discipline (Figure 9). This type of organizational structure
tends to incentivize functional excellence since employees are judged by those within their same
profession.
A key disadvantage of a functional structure is "when it is involved in multiple projects,
conflicts invariably arise over the relative priorities of these projects in the competition for
resources." (Youker, 1977)
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Figure 9: Functional Organization
The second basic organizational structure is one that is organized around each individual
project (Figure 10). This structure is often referred to as a project-based structure. A project
manager operating within this type of structure "is given considerable authority over the project
and may acquire resources from either inside or outside the overall organization. All personnel
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on the project are under the direct authority of the project manager for the duration of the
project." (Youker, 1977) The main advantage to this type of structure is that the focus is clearly
placed on project success. However, this approach also has its disadvantages. Resources are
often duplicated across multiple projects. The skill level of personnel may also degrade since
functional departments have little authority to make professional growth a priority.
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Figure 10: Project-based Organization
The third basic organizational structure is the matrix and is the most commonly seen since it
tries "to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both the project and functional
structures." (Youker, 1977) The structure attempts to balance the needs of project managers with
effective management of functional personnel Figure 11. The main disadvantage with this
structure is that personnel assigned to projects have two supervisors; the project manager and
their functional supervisor. Conflicting direction can generate confusion and create tension
between project managers and functional leads. A common source of tension is assignment of
high quality personnel. Each program manager naturally wants the best personnel working on his
team and conflicts may occur if the functional lead chooses to place them on another team.
Figure 11: Matrix Organization
If an enterprise has existed long enough, it is likely that it has experienced all three
structures. Since organizational structure is very visible it is often the first thing modified during
efforts to improve the performance of an enterprise.
Chapter 5 Air Force Aircraft Acquisition Enterprise Stakeholder Analysis
Prior to applying Tainter's theory of collapse to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise,
it is helpful to understand who the primary stakeholders are and how they interact within the
enterprise. Grossi (2003) as well as the MIT Lean Advancement Initiative's Enterprise Strategic
Analysisfor Transformation methodology provide guidance for completing a stakeholder
analysis. A top-level stakeholder analysis of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise was
performed that included identification of the key stakeholders, a review of their responsibilities
and a listing of the value each stakeholder group extracts and delivers from the enterprise.
5.1 Stakeholder Identification
Based upon Defense Acquisition University training materials and personal experience, the
primary stakeholders of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise can be categorized into six
primary stakeholder groups as shown below in Table 1.
Table 1: Stakeholder Categories within the Air Force Aircraft Acquisition Enterprise
Categories Stakeholders
Users (Customers) e Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF)
* Combatant commands
* Air Force major commands
* Airmen in operational roles
Senior Acquisition Leadership 0 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
(USD(AT&L))
* Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF)
* Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (SAF/AQ)
* Program Executive Officers (PEOs)
Acquisition Workforce * SAF/AQ workforce
* Product center workforce (Military, Civ, Ctr)
Defense Contractors * Shareholders
* Defense contractor workforce
Supporting agencies (External) * Defense Contract Management Agency
* Defense Contract Audit Agency
* Small Business Administration
* General Services Administration
US Government (Legislative Branch) * Legislators (House and Senate)
* Congressional staffers
e US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
Taxpayers * US Population
5.1.1 Users (Customers)
Broadly speaking, the customers of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise are those
who will use the weapon systems and supporting equipment that is acquired to perform military
missions. Within the acquisition community, these customers are often referred to as "users".
Predominantly, these users are Airmen-operational Air Force members. Each of the military
services has the responsibility to organize, train and equip forces for use by combatant
commanders (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff). The Air Force Chief of Staff is responsible for carrying
out these actions for the Department of the Air Force.
When engaged in operations, airmen fall under the authority of combatant commanders.
Therefore, by extension, the combatant commands should also be considered users. In fact,
combatant commanders have frequently exerted pressure to ensure their needs are met by each of
the services.
Adhering to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process,
requirements for new systems within the Air Force are generated by each of the operational Air
Force major commands such as Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command and are
ultimately endorsed by the CSAF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5.1.2 Acquisition Senior Leadership
At the broadest level, the senior leadership of the Department of Defense relies upon three
inter-related systems (processes) to make decisions concerning requirements, planning,
programming and budgeting and acquisition as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: DoD Decision Support Systems (DAU, 2010)
Each of these systems empower a set of leaders within the executive branch to make
decisions within one or more of the systems. The authority to acquire weapon systems resides in
a specialized chain of command that flows from the Department of Defense to the services as
outlined by Defense Acquisition System regulations. "DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense
Acquisition System, provides the policies and principles that govern the defense acquisition
system. DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, in turn
establishes the management framework that implements these policies and principles" as shown
in Figure 13 (DAU, 2010)
Figure 13: DoD 5000 Acquisition System-Lifecycle view (DAU, 2010)
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At the DoD level, this process is led by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) who also
holds the title of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)). The Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise operates within this overarching
DoD framework and is managed by a leadership structure led by the Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ). Authority flows from this individual to Program Executive
Officers (PEOs). These PEOs manage a portfolio of programs, each led by a program manager.
This stakeholder group is responsible for managing the acquisition process as well as each
program to ensure products are acquired and delivered to the users (DAU, 2010).
5.1.3 Acquisition Workforce
The acquisition workforce stakeholder group consists of the rank and file employees within
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. This workforce includes military members assigned
to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, government civilian employees and support
contractors. As of September, 2011 this stakeholder group included just over 5,600 individuals
(Fecher, 2011). Within this group, there are a number of functional specialties, including
contracting officers, program managers, financial managers and logisticians. They are charged
with completing the day to day tasks as outlined in Defense and Air Force acquisition system
regulations.
5.1.4 Defense Contractors
Defense contractors are a powerful group of stakeholders within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. They are responsible for designing and producing the equipment that is
ultimately acquired by the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Their efforts are primarily
governed by contracts awarded and managed by the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
workforce. Example firms within this stakeholder group include Boeing, Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman. Besides the "Big Three" prime contractors, this group also includes all
subcontractors including large firms such as Raytheon and BAE Systems. Each firm within this
group includes its own set of stakeholders including shareholders, management and employees.
5.1.5 External Supporting Agencies
Outside of the workforce assigned to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, there are a
number of government agencies which support the enterprise externally. Some of these activities
are supportive in nature while others are performed in an oversight type manner. The agencies
exercise a great deal of power and can affect the content and award of contracts.
Example agencies that fall within this category of stakeholders are the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). According to DAU's
mission statement, the purpose of the organization is to "Provide a global learning environment
to support a mission-ready Defense Acquisition Workforce that develops, delivers, and sustains
effective and affordable warfighting capabilities." In addition to providing training and
education, DAU manages the acquisition certification process, provides direct assistance to
acquisition organizations and maintains an extensive library of on-line training and reference
material (DAU, 2010). The DCAA provides both support and oversight:
The DCAA, while serving the public interest as its primary customer, shall perform all
necessary contract audits for the Department of Defense and provide accounting and
financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DoD Components
responsible for procurement and contract administration. These services are provided in
connection with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts to
ensure taxpayer dollars are spent on fair and reasonable contract prices." (Defense Contract
Audit Agency).
5.1.6 Legislative Branch
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides the Congress with the authority to raise
and support armies and a navy (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8). It is this power of the purse which makes
the legislative branch the most powerful of stakeholder groups. The primary stakeholders within
this group are the legislators themselves, both in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Also within this stakeholder group are the supporting congressional staff members. Career
congressional staffers dedicated to defense issues are highly knowledgeable and exert
considerable influence. Another stakeholder in this group is Congress's investigative arm, the
Government Accountability Office. The GAO "is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works
for Congress. Often called the "congressional watchdog," GAO investigates how the federal
government spends taxpayer dollars." Members of Congress often call upon the GAO for the
following purposes:
. auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are being spent efficiently
and effectively;
- investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities;
. reporting on how well government programs and policies are meeting their objectives;
. performing policy analyses and outlining options for congressional consideration; and
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. issuing legal decisions and opinions, such as bid protest rulings and reports on agency
rules. (U.S. GAO)
5.1.7 Taxpayers
The last group of stakeholders are the U.S. taxpayers. While they do not play a direct role in
the day-to-day operation of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, they are ultimately the
source of funding and authority for the enterprise as a whole. Their perceptions concerning the
operation of the system can greatly influence the behavior and motivations of elected officials
and their subordinate stakeholders within the legislative branch.
5.2 Stakeholder Responsibilities and Value Exchange
Each of the stakeholder groups identified above have responsibilities within the context of
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Table 2 below provides a listing of the top-level
responsibilities of each group.
Table 2: Responsibilities of Stakeholders within the Air Force Aircraft Acquisition Enterprise
Stakeholder Group Defense Acquisition System Responsibilties
Users (Customers) * Provide requirements
e Advocate for and obtain funding
e Program priority recommendations
Senior Acquisition Leadership * Resource allocation decisions
o Funding and manpower
* Enforce program priorities
* Programming and budgeting
Acquisition Workforce * Manage programs
o Define schedules
o Estimate costs
o Define technical specifications
* Initiate and maintain Contracts
* Comply with law and policy
Defense Contractors e Provide capabilities and products
* Perform as contracted
* Innovate and preserve advantage
* Comply with law and policy
Supporting agencies (External) * Enhance enterprise performance
* Ensure compliance with law and policy
US Government (Legislative Branch) o Appropriations and authorizations
* Serve constituents
Taxpayers * Elect legislators
e Provide funding
Each primary stakeholder group both contributes and extracts value from its interaction with
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. It is important to understand these interactions
because they act as incentives and motivations for behavior. Table 3 provides a top-level listing
of the values extracted and contributed to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise by each of
the primary stakeholder groups.
Table 3: Air Force Aircraft Acquisition Enterprise Stakeholder Value Exchange
Value Extracted From the Enterprise Stakeholder Group Value Contributed to the Enterprise
" Weapon systems Users (Customers) * Requirements
e Products and services e Operational insight
* Delivery Timeliness e Program advocacy
e Cost-effectiveness
e Weapon systems Senior Acquisition Leadership * Program decisions
* Program management 0 Program priorities
* Accurate estimates 0 Resource allocations
e Expert knowledge 0 Support for Air Force
* Regulatory aircraft acquisition
Compliance enterprise
" Employment Acquisition Workforce * Acquisition strategy
* Suitable training and execution




* Compensation Defense Contractors * Weapon Systems
e Profits e Products and services
e Risk reduction e Subject matter
e Clear expectations expertise
* Program execution
* Utilization Supporting agencies * Education/training
* Support (External) * Policy enforcement
* Compliance * Approvals
* Oversight
* Weapon systems US Government (Legislative * Appropriations
e Employment Branch) * Authorization
* Compliance * Approvals
* Oversight
e Weapon systems Taxpayers * Funding
e Stewardship * Support
The primary value of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is producing weapon
systems as well as supporting products and services. These weapon systems are used by
operational users to generate combat capability which by extension provides national security to
both the government as well as taxpayers.
Value is also extracted from the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise in the form of
compensation and profits, primarily by the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce
and defense contractors. Support in the form of sponsorship and funding is also provided to
supporting agencies. Lastly, a key value extracted from the enterprise is employment. This is a
key concern for the legislative stakeholder group. Employment within a legislator's jurisdiction
may include both government and/or contractor positions. Since these jobs tend to be highly
skilled and well-paying, they are highly sought after and zealously protected by legislators at all
levels of government. The predominant value contributed by the primary stakeholder groups to
the enterprise arrives in the form of requirements, funding and approvals.
This top-level stakeholder analysis provides an understanding of the key players within the
Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. These stakeholders drive the both the structure and
operation of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Understanding their motivations and
contributions provides a basis for examining the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise in the
context of Tainter's theory.
Chapter 6 Research Methodology
Since Tainter developed and applied this theory at the societal level, careful consideration
was given to how best to apply it at the enterprise level in an analysis of the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. In each of his societal case studies, Tainter followed a common pattern.
The first step was articulating how and where complexity grew in the society over time. This was
done by citing sources that documented increases in complexity within one of his four primary
societal processes: agriculture and resource production, information processing, sociopolitical
control/specialization and overall economic production. Next, Tainter focused on evidence of
diminishing marginal returns within these processes as complexity within them grew. Lastly,
Tainter described what impact the declining returns had on the society and how they culminated
in an increased probability of collapse.
A similar research methodology was followed for the analysis of Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. First, evidence of complexity was gathered across three primary process
areas: personnel specialization/organizational structure, resource management, and regulatory
guidance/policies. Next, evidence of diminishing marginal returns in the effectiveness of the
enterprise was documented. Information was then gathered on what actions were took in an
effort to improve the performance of the enterprise. In this area, the focus was on the last 20
years, and was concentrated on the internal workings of the Aeronautical Systems Center.
6.1 Archival Records
A tremendous amount of information was obtained from the archival records maintained by
the Aeronautical Systems Center History Office. Specifically, annual historical reports authored
by staff historians as well as archived organizational documentation were used. The ASC
Historian, Mr. Henry Narducci and his assistant historian, Ms. Tasha Hairston provided access to
the unclassified archives and provided guidance on where to locate particular types of
information.
In addition to the ASC history office, a considerable amount of information was gathered
from material produced and placed on-line by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ)
The DAU maintains a large repository of defense acquisition training and guidance
information on line. This information includes defense acquisition processes, recommended
practices, and regulatory guidance. Documentation types include course materials, articles, tool
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kits and guidebooks. One DAU source that was particularly useful was the Defense Acquisition
Guidebook which serves as a reference for acquisition policies and a "discretionary best
practices guide" (DAU, 2010)
Another source of information concerning the acquisition policies and procedures of the Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise was the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition (SAF/AQ). While also acting in a supervisory role over the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise, SAF/AQ is also responsible for ensuring that the acquisition workforce is
properly trained as required by law, Department of Defense and Department of the Air Force
regulations (Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force). SAF/AQ is aided in this effort by
the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) which is the Air Force major command tasked with
managing, training and equipping the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce.
All of the above archival sources provided evidence of system complexity. The ASC annual
historical reports were a primary source of information concerning changes over time in the
enterprise's organizational structure as well as information on what the responses of leadership
were to perceived diminishing returns and inadequacies in Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise performance. Information concerning complexity within the areas of resource
management was gathered primarily from DAU materials dealing with financial management
and program control. DAU and SAF/AQ were primary sources for information concerning
defense acquisition regulations and policies. The GAO was also a very useful source for
historical program information.
6.2 Interviews
A number of interviews were conducted in order to gain first hand insight concerning the
operation of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Interviewees were categorized by their
seniority and level of experience as shown below in Table 4.
Table 4: Interviewee Demographics
Interviewee Category Interviewees
Senior-level personnel 0 Military (2)
Significant defense acq experience o Rank of Colonel or higher
o Greater than 10 years exp. e Government Civilians (5)
o Grade of GS-15 or SES
e Defense Contractors (3)
o Senior managers / vice-presidents
Mid-level personnel e Military (5)
* Moderate defense acq experience o Rank of Major or Lt Colonel
o Greater than 5 years exp. * Government Civilians (2)
o Grade of GS-12 -GS-14
Low-level personnel * Military (2)
* Some defense acq experience o Rank of Captain
o Less than 5 years exp.
Interviews primarily served two research purposes. The majority of interviews were used to
gain insight into what individuals working within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise felt
were the causes of organizational ineffectiveness or inefficiency. These interviews also included
questions concerning complexity and its perceived impact across the enterprise. Lastly, questions
were asked to gain an understanding of how people really operated within the enterprise in order
to accomplish the mission. In particular, what kind of workarounds were the most prevalent. At a
minimum, the following questions were asked during these types of interviews:
e What are the reasons for ineffective performance within the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise?
* What role do the following concepts play in the success of acquisition programs?




* What do people do in situations where the size or complexity of a project has grown too
large?
* What do people in your organization do in the face of very restrictive processes or
regulations that are perceived to hamper progress on a project?
" What effect does process and/or organizational complexity have on acquisition program
success?
* What would you do to improve the effectiveness of the enterprise?
The second type of interview focused on obtaining information concerning the issue of
specialty metal use. This information was used to augment case study research documentation.
Interviews were conducted with individuals who were familiar with the issues caused by the use
of foreign titanium by defense contractors. Primary interviewees concerning this topic were:
e Mr. Rick Buschagen
e Former Chief of Compliance within the Aeronautical Systems Center Contracting
Functional
e Major Greg Watson, USAF (Ret)
e Former lead Air Combat Command representative and current government civilian
program manager within the F- 15 system program office
As the former chief of compliance, Mr. Buschagen had a tremendous amount of firsthand
knowledge concerning the issues surrounding the use of foreign source specialty metal in aircraft
acquisitions. Maj Watson also had firsthand knowledge of the issue but from the perspective of a
customer who was impacted by the delays caused by the issue.
6.3 Surveys
In addition to interviews, an informal survey was conducted at the start of the effort in order
to gain an understanding of how individuals viewed complexity, especially when manifested in
ways that created diseconomies of scale. Forty survey responses were collected from engineering
and program management professionals with experience in defense acquisition. Survey
responses were collected in two venues. The first venue was an INCOSE systems engineering
conference conducted in Los Angles California on April 1 5th and 16 th, 2011. The second venue
was the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Responses at this venue
were collected during research trips in August and October 2011. The number of survey
responses collected across each level of defense acquisition related experience is shown below in
Figure 14.
Figure 14: Experience Level of Survey Respondents
The first of three survey questions asked respondents how they knew a program had become
too large. Since the term "complexity" can be construed in many ways, the term "complex" was
replaced with "large", which often is also accompanied with a high level of complexity. The first
response to be rated dealt with the time it takes to make a decision.
The second response question dealt with incentives and how a large, complex project may
result in changes in the behavior of decision makers within the enterprise. Lastly, room was left
to collect handwritten comments from respondents as well (Figure 15).
How do you know a project or program has become too large?
The time to make decisions increases excessively? Never Rarely SometiRmes Always
U U 7 U U
Management begins to sub-optimize, making decisions that maximize
only local outcomes? Never Rarely Sometimes Always
Other?
Figure 15: Survey Question 1
The second question was geared towards understanding what individuals do when a
program's size or level of complexity becomes too great. As shown in Figure 16, respondents




the second and third dealt with additional administrative complexity in the form of additional
processes or interactions.
What do people do in situations where the size or complexity of a project has grown too great?
increase the number of management levels? N e e A
Institute unnecessary or overly cumbersome processes? Neer Rarely Sometimes Always
Attempt to remain coordinated by holding additional meetings? Never Rarely Sometimes Always
O C D S S
Other?
Figure 16: Survey Question 2
The final question of the survey was open ended, asking: "What do people do in the face of
very restrictive processes or regulations that are perceived to hamper progress on a project?" The
intent of this question was to look for evidence of what Tainter calls "scanning behavior", where
individuals frustrated with the level of complexity and the perception of low marginal return on
their efforts seek "alternatives that might provide a preferable adaption." (Tainter, 1988)
6.4 Berry Amendment Specialty Metals Case Study
Lastly, research for this thesis included gathering information to document a case study
involving the use of specialty metals. Between 1991 and 2008, the use of foreign specialty
metals in military aircraft acquisitions was a contentious issue. This topic was selected for
inclusion since it was particularly illustrative of the challenges and the costs created by
complexity within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Specifically, the case provides
insight into how complexity within the areas of stakeholder incentives, policies, and
organizational structure can result in diminished returns.
Chapter 7 Evidence of Complexity
As discussed above, Tainter defines complexity as the combination of structural
differentiation and organization. The first step in demonstrating that Tainter's theory has
relevance for the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is verifying that there is a high level of
complexity present within the organization. This was done by gathering evidence of complexity
across three primary process areas: personnel specialization/organizational structure, resource
management, and regulatory guidance/policies.
Information on personnel special qualifications and training requirements was gathered from
material produced by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) and the Aeronautical Systems Center. The DAU is the
Department of Defense's "corporate university" for defense acquisition workforce. According to
its mission statement, it is responsible for supplying the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
workforce with:
* Acquisition certification and leadership training
" Mission assistance to acquisition organizations and teams
e Online knowledge-sharing resources
" Continuous learning assets (DAU, 2010)
While also acting in a supervisory role over the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) is also responsible
for ensuring that the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce is properly trained as
required by law, Department of Defense and Department of the Air Force regulations (Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force). It is aided in this effort by the Air Force Materiel
Command (AFMC) which is the Air Force major command tasked with managing, training and
equipping the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce.
Lastly, the Aeronautical Systems Center is the core Air Force organization operating within
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. It is one of three product centers within AFMC and
is responsible for the acquisition of "aerospace weapon systems". According to AFMC, ASC's
parent organization:
ASC designs, develops and delivers dominant aerospace weapon systems and
capabilities for the Air Force, other U.S. military, allied and coalition-partner warfighters.
ASC is charged with acquiring and modernizing the Air Force's aerial systems. The center
focuses on speed and innovation in acquisition management, as well as on rapid transition of
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technology into systems, business practices, development and retention of a high
performance work force. (AFMC Public Affairs, 2011)
Based upon the above description of its responsibilities, the Aeronautical Systems Center is
responsible for both developing and retaining a workforce prepared to conduct defense
acquisition work focused on aerospace weapon systems.
Evidence of complexity in the area of organizational structure and hierarchical specialization
was gathered by examining Aeronautical Systems Center History Office records. Specifically,
annual historical reports authored by staff historians as well as archived organizational
documentation were used. Information concerning complexity within the areas of resource
management was gathered primarily from DAU materials dealing with financial management
and program control. DAU and SAF/AQ were also the primary sources for information
concerning defense acquisition regulations and policies.
7.1 Personnel Specialization/Organizational Structure
At the societal level, Tainter discusses how complexity tends to grow in the areas of
information processing and sociopolitical control/specialization. Within the realm of information
processing, one clear sign that complexity has increased is reliance on specialized training also
increases (Tainter, 1988). The Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce is very large
and highly specialized.
Considering only those directly employed by the U.S. Air Force at the Aeronautical Systems
Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, there are over 5,600 people engaged in the enterprise (Fecher,
2011). In comparison, in 2008, less than 2,000 commercial firms out of the 27,281,452 operating
within the United States employed over 5,000 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011).






7.1.1 Career Field Specialization
In order to become a member of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise workforce, a
significant amount of specialized training is required. In addition to being segmented by their
type of employment contract, each employee within the active duty and government civilian
types is also categorized according to a career field or functional designation. According to







* Scientific Research and Development
* Test and Evaluation
* Production, Manufacturing & Quality Assurance (SAF/AQ, 2011)
Rather than the nine functional categories described above, the Defense Acquisition
University divides the workforce into 15 functional career fields for certification and
qualification tracking. As shown in Figure 17 below, each career field is also divided into three
levels of expertise based upon training completed and duration of experience serving in the field.
Figure 17: Defense Acquisition Workforce Career Fields (DAU, 2011)
Exploring the Business-Cost Estimating career field further provides additional evidence of
the large amount of personnel specialization and organization present across the defense
acquisition workforce. As shown in Figure 18, in order to achieve Level 1 basic certification, an
individual must first complete a "baccalaureate degree engineering, statistics, or other math
intensive field of study." (DAU, 2011) In addition to the college degree, required and optional
additional training is also called for in the form of DAU courses on acquisition fundamentals,
financial management and cost analysis. Lastly, two years of experience working in a cost
estimating role are required for basic certification.
CERTIFICATION STANDARDS & CORE PLUS DEVELOPMENT GUIDE I
ACO is Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management
SOC1f2 Fundamentals of Earned Value Management
SUCf 103 Fundamentals of Business Financial Management
* BCF 106 Fundamentals of Cost Analysis
* BCF 107 Applied Cost Analysis (R)
* Baccalaureate degree (any field of study)
0 3 semester credit hours from a calculus course
0 21 semester credit hours in any combination of the following fields of study operations research, economics,
mathematics, chemistry, physics or other sciences where the utilization of advanced mathematical skis in geometry,
gonometry, statistics, probability, andfor quantitative analysis
2 years of acquisition experience in Cost Estimating
CLB"A4 Acquisilon Reporing Concep s and Policy Requirements for APB, DAES, and 3AR
CLjjj Inlroduclion to Earned Value Management
CLg 17 Peformance Measurement Baseline
CLB018 Earned Value and Financial Management Reports
CL01 EsUmate atComplelon
CLO020 Baseline Maintenance
LjCQM Simpned Acquisinon Procedures
CLMJ16 Cost Estimating
Baccalaureale degree in engineering, statistics, or other math intensive field of study
2 years of acqulsillon experience in Cost Estimating
Noftes:
I The Core Certification Standards section lists the training, education, and experience REQUIRED for certification at this level.
2 "(R)" following a course title indicates the course is delivered as resident based instruction.
3 When preparing your IDP, you and your supervisor should consider the training, education, and experience listed in this Core Plus
Developrnent Guide if not already completed.
Figure 18: Basic Qualifications for Cost-Estimating Career Field (DAU, 2011)
Figure 19 and Figure 20 provide listings of what is required to be certified at the
intermediate and senior levels in the cost estimating career field. In order to produce a
professional in the cost estimating career field, a significant amount of time and resources in the
form of additional training must be expended. In fact, a minimum of seven years of experience is
required before an individual is considered Level III certified (DAU, 2011).
0 aM MA uenneaaiw sysutems acqusmon, ran A
SAC= I2Bntermedlate Systems Acquision, Padt B(R)
" ff2 Intermediate Cost Analysis (R)
SoCF.2ff Cost Risk Analysis (R)
SCff 211 Acquisition Business Management (R)
SDCF 21I Operating and Support Cost Analysis (R)
0 CLB02 Forecasting Techniques
g CLM Data CoNection and Sources
0 Baccalaureate degree (any feld of study)
@ 3 semester credit hours from a calculus course
0 21 semester credit hours in any combinaton of the following gelds of study- operations research, economics,
mathemaics, chemilstry, physics or other sciences where the utilization of advanced mathemaical skiNs in geometry,
trigonometry, statistics, probabilly, andlor quanlRaive analysis
4 years of acquisition experience In Cost Estimating
AC2MissionfocsedSefWcesAcquisMON(I V
BCF2 Economic Analysis (R)
BCF2U EVMSVaNdalon and Suveilance(R) 
BCZ6 Principles of Schedule Management (R) V
L= Confac Source Sele on
CLCm Indirect Costs
CLas Analyzing Prot or Fee
CLMets Product Support Business Case Analysis (BCA)
CLL . b*oduon to Defense Distribution
12.K Schduling
Cg.LV& IT Management and Leadership V
Contracling Overview
CM 2Evollonary AcqMOn
LOG log Acquisiton Logis#cs Fundamentals
Ph2AI Program Management Tools Course, Part I
PMT 267 Program Management Tools Course, Part il
AR tBaic Sollware Acquisition Management
B ccl aur a e re e in en g in e e n g, 
st tislics , or oth er M ath inten sive gold 
of study
4 years of acquision experience in Cost Estimating
Ilotes:
1 The Core Certification Standards section lists the training, education, and experience REQUIRED for certification at this level.
2 "(R)" folloving a course title indicates the course is delivered as resident based instruction.
5 When preparing your IDP, you and your supervisor should consider the training, education, and experience listed in the Core Plus Development
Guide at this and the lo~r level(s) if not already completed.
Figure 19:Intermediate Qualifications for Cost-Estimating Career Field (DAU, 2011)
I CERTIFICATION STANDARDS & CORE PLUS DEVELOPMENT GUIDE
renorms analyses ana esumates Tor a vaney or programs ana ales on managemem aceves to ensure cost
analysis is conducted properly
Core ertn ictionatll S r a
Acquisition Training identified at leveil must have been completed
" Functional Training identified at Level I must have been completed
* Cf3 Advanced Concepts in Cost Analysis (R)
" CLB023 Software Cost Estimating
OCL2 Rates
0 Baccalaureate degree (any field of study)
0 3 semester credit hours from a calculus course
0 21 semester credit hours in any combination of the following fields of study- operations research, economics,
mathematics, chemistry, physics or other sciences where the utilzation of advanced mathematical skills In geometry,
trigonometry, statistics, probability, andfor quantitative analysis
7 years of acquisition experience in Cost Estimating
I Grauate aegree in engineenng, staisucs, or oner uam intensive 1eia or suay
7 years of acquisition experience in Cost Estimating
Notes:
1 The Core Certification Standards section lists the training, education, and experience REQUIRED for certification at this level.
2 "(R)" following a course title indicates the course is delivered as resident based instruction.
5 When preparing your IDP, you and your supervisor should consider the training, education, and experience listed in the Core Plus Development
Guide at this and the lower level(s) if not already completed.
Figure 20: Senior Qualifications for Cost-Estimating Career Field (DAU, 2011)
Similar qualification requirements exist for the other 14 career fields. It is clear from these
qualification listings alone that there is large amount of personnel specialization present in the
Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. This specialization is also paired with a substantial
amount of organization. DAU provides the instructors, coursework, and supporting physical and
IT infrastructure necessary to administer the training classes. Additionally, each military service
maintains information on the acquisition qualifications of their workforce. For the Air Force, this
is done through the Air Force Internet Registrations System for Acquisition Training, commonly
known as the ACQ Now system (ATTRS Online System, 2011). The system allows individuals
to apply for courses and generate training plans which are then both reviewed and approved by
their supervisors. The system also maintains a record of work completed and qualifications
attained which are also then recorded in individual personnel employment records.
7.1.2 Hierarchical Specialization
In addition to specialization at the personnel level, hierarchical specialization is also present
within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. If we again narrow our focus to only the
military organization at the Aeronautical Systems Center, we find in place the organizational
structure shown in Figure 21. The fact that the individual blocks are barely legible is an indicator
itself that the level of hierarchical specialization is high. The Acquisition Systems Center is led
by a 3-star general who serves as the center commander. Beneath him, the organization is
divided into 5 mission-specific directorates, two geographical support organizations and 10
functional organizations. Another layer down, each directorate includes a number of additional
subdivisions in the form of divisions, branches and offices.
The mission directorates are organized in a matrix type structure with each one managing
projects within a single aerospace mission space. For example, the fighters and bombers
directorate is responsible for overseeing program offices managing fighter procurement and
upgrades for the F-22, F-16, F-15 and A-10. It is also overseeing efforts to upgrade the B-2, B-1,
and B-52 bombers. Within the F-15 program office alone, there are more than 50 people
assigned (Fecher, 2011). This workforce includes individuals from each of the personnel
specialties discussed above including program managers, contracting officers and engineers.
These individuals are managed both by the leaders of their mission area organizations as well as
their functional leads within the functional organizations (Fecher, 2011).
Clearly there is a substantial amount of hierarchical complexity within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. The matrix organizational structure contains both hierarchical
specialization, grouped by mission area and function as well as a great deal of organization based
upon a military chain of command and functional supervision.
Figure 21: Aeronautical Systems Center Organizational Chart, November 2010
7.2 Resource Management
The second area within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise where evidence of
complexity can be verified is in resource management. Two examples of complexity within this
area are the Future Year Defense Program structure and earned value management.
7.2.1 Future Year Defense Program
In contrast to the old adage, not all money is "green" within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. The U.S. stipulates that only the Congress has the authority to appropriate
funds for military use (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8). This power is zealously protected by the
legislative branch. In order to ensure compliance with Congress's intent and account for funding,
the DoD relies upon the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP). The DoD's handbook on the
FYDP structure provides a general description of the resource management system:
The FYDP summarizes resources ([total obligation authority], manpower, and forces)
associated, by fiscal year, with Department of Defense programs, as approved by the
Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. These programs reflect decisions embodied in
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) documents such as the Strategic
Planning Guidance (SPG), the Fiscal Guidance, the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), the
Program Decision Memoranda (PDM), and Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) (all internal
DoD documents that are not available for public release).
The FYDP contains prior year (PY), current year (CY) and the two budget years (BYl
and BY2) through BY2 + 4 years (BY2 +7 years for forces). It is updated with every
program and budget submission to OSD and with the President's Budget Submission each
year, in accordance with DoDI 7045.7 (reference (a)). (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011)
The FYDP structure consists of a "two-dimensional matrix report that links DoD resources
and programs." The first of the two dimensions consists of "eleven Major Force Programs (MFP)
-- six combat force-oriented programs and five support programs." (U.S. Department of Defense,
2011).
e Program 1 - Strategic Forces *
e Program 2 - General Purpose Forces *
e Program 3 - Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence *
e Program 4 - Mobility Forces *
* Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces *
e Program 6 - Research and Development
e Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance
e Program 8 - Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities
e Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities
e Program 10 - Support of Other Nations
e Program 11 - Special Operations Forces *
*Combat Forces Program
These eleven MFPs are divided into thousands of individual [program elements]. In its
second dimension, the FYDP has three broad categories of resources: TOA (enumerating
dollars (in thousands)), manpower (enumerating military endstrength and civilian full-time-
equivalent workyears), and forces (either items of equipment or combat units). Generally,
the FYDP's programs may be considered to be outputs, while its resources may be
considered to be inputs. Hence, the FYDP crosswalks the Department's internal review
structure (which is primarily output oriented) with the congressional review structure (which
specifies inputs to the Department). The Department's official record on DoD outputs (to
satisfy the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)) is the
Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress (reference (c)).
FYDP PEs are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and are continually scrutinized
to maintain proper visibility of defense programs as the programs themselves change and as
the Department's leadership requires new ways of examining DoD programs and resources.
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2011)
Within the FYDP structure, the Air Force is assigned program element codes for each one of
its efforts that require funding. These efforts include aerospace weapon system acquisition
programs managed by the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. As an example, all funding
associated with the F-15 A/B/C/D has a program element number that includes code 0207130F.
When a contract or order is cut for a product or service, a fund cite is attached that provides an
accounting of the funds used for the action as shown in Figure 22.
Fund Cite Structure (For RDT&E Appn Fund Type C)






Operating Agency Code 47
Allotment Serial Number 20
Budget Program (First 2 digits of BPAC)__68
Project Number (30 thrn6& digits of BPAC)__1307
Material Program Code (MPC) 020100
Elements of Expensedlnvestment Code (EEIC) 000000
Program Element Code (PEC) 27130F
Accounting and Disbursing Station Number(ADSN) 503000
Department of Defense Activity Address Directory Code (DODAAD) F03000
Figure 22: Fund Cite Structure (Ark, 2007)
Besides the program element, the appropriation symbol is important because it provides
information on what kind of activities may be funded by a particular Congressional
appropriation. In the above example, the code 3600 is used. This code is indicates that the
funding is reserved for efforts that involve research and development and/or test and evaluation.
Within the Air Force, the following appropriation symbols are commonly used:
Investment Appropriations:
* Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) (3600)
* Aircraft Procurement (3010)
e Missile Procurement (3020)
e Other Procurement (3080)
* Military Construction (MILCON) (3300)
Operation and Maintenance Appropriations
" Operation and Maintenance Appropriations (O&M) (3400)
e Military Personnel (MILPERS) (3500) (Ark, 2007)
It is evident from the FYDP structure that a high level of complexity is present. Funding is
distributed by Congress to meet a myriad of military requirements ranging from research and
development to military personnel pay. This specificity is coupled with a highly organized
accounting structure and a highly specialized financial management workforce to ensure funding
is only used for its intended purpose.
7.2.2 Earned Value Management
Once funds are appropriated and obligated on a particular acquisition project within the Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, the performance associated with those funds are often
tracked using Earned Value Management (EVM). This system of tracking the relationship
between cost, schedule and performance began evolving in the 1950s from a predecessor system
known as PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique). As EVM has evolved within
defense acquisition from the 1950s to the present, it has grown in sophistication and has returned
to its original role as a program management tool. Within the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise, prior to the late 1990s, EVM was often viewed only as a financial management tool
and was not used by program managers to the extent it is today (Abba, 2004).
The intent here is not to provide a primer on the workings of EVM but to show that the
tracking system is a source of complexity within the realm of resource management within the
Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Figure 23 below is the EVM reference sheet distributed
by the Defense Acquisition University. It is evident from this artifact alone that collecting the
data necessary to compute EVM measures of performance requires a high level of complexity in
the form of specialized expertise and organization. Additional complexity is required to properly
interpret and act upon the information produced by EVM reporting systems.
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Figure 23: Earned Value Management Reference Sheet (DAU, 2011)
Just as a great deal of complexity was found to be present within the personnel and
hierarchical aspects of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, it is clear that a significant
amount of complexity is present within the resource management area as well. The appropriation
of funding and the tracking of its use rely upon the FYDP structure. This structure helps ensure
that funding valued in the billions annually is used for the purpose it was intended.
Accomplishing this task requires a high level of complexity both in the nomenclature and the
organization necessary for the system to function.
Earned Value Management is undoubtedly a powerful tool for tracking acquisition program
progress. However, the insight it provides to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise also
comes with a cost. It also requires a high level of complexity to properly collect the data and
process it across programs valued in the millions of dollars and employing thousands of defense
contractors.
7.3 Regulatory guidance and policies
A final area where evidence of high complexity was gathered was regulatory guidance and
policies. Within the defense acquisition environment including within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise, two primary sources of guidance exist. The first are regulations under the
umbrella of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second is the DoD 5000 series regulations.
7.3.1 Federal Acquisition Regulations
All work done for the U.S. government is ideally performed under the provisions of a
contract between the government and the entity performing the service or providing the product.
The regulations that govern this contracting process are referred to as the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, commonly known as the "FAR". As discussed in the course materials for CLC-01 1,
a DAU introductory course on federal contracting:
The size of the regulations that govern the Federal, and in turn the DOD contracting
processes, is legendary. A full understanding of DOD contracting requires having a sense of
the various requirements, procedures, guidelines, and forms that contracting officers must
work with daily as they attempt to meet their customers' requirements.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) governs the Federal procurement process,
while the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) provides guidance
specifically for the DOD environment. The FAR consists of 53 parts, and the DFARS
supplements 49 of those parts. The military departments and agencies, in turn, provide their
own supplements. (DAU, 2011)
When pasted into Microsoft Word using a 12-point font, the table of contents for the FAR
alone numbers 107 pages in length. The total length of the regulations and guidance under each
of the 53 parts numbers in the thousands of pages. For illustration, a portion of the table of
contents for FAR Part 13, Simplified Acquisitions is included in Figure 24. It includes 5 sub
parts that consist of 29 sections. Clearly this level of specificity and the organization required to
manage it result in a high level of complexity.
FAR- Part 13
SimplifiedAciqsitonProcekures




13.004- Legal Effectof quoatiomn.
13.005- Federal Acqtsition Streamiirw Actof 1994 List of lnampcble Laws.




13.103- Use of Standine Price Quotations.
13.104- Promotirn Competiton.
13.105-Synopsis and Postina ReoAirements.
13.106-Solictin Corpeidior Evaluationof Quotatios or Offers, Award and
Docurnentation.
13.106-1 -Solicirng Competition.
13.106-2 - Evaluation of Quotations or Offers.
13.106-3 - Award and Docurentation.
Subpart 13.2- Actions at or Below the Miao-Purchase Threshold
13.201-General.
13.202- Purchase Guidknes.
Subpart 13.3 -Simpliied Atistion Method
13.301-Governmentwide Commwnercial Purchase Card.
13.302- Purchase Orders.
13.302-1 -General.
13.302-2 - Unpriced Pwchase Orders.
13.302-3 - Obtaining Cortrackw Acceptarce and ModifyirE Purchase Orders.
13.302-4 - Terrnnation or Cancelation of Purchase Orders.
13.302-5 - Clauses.
13.303- Blanket Purchase Agreemerts (BPAs.
13.303-1 -General.
13.303-2 - Establishmentof BPAs.
13.303-3 - Preparation of BPAs.
13.303-4 - Clauses.
13.303-5 - Purchases Under BPAs.
13.303-6 - Review Procedures.
13.303-7 - Completion of BPAs.
13.303-8 - Optional Clause.
13.304- [Reserved]
13.305- Imprest Fundh and Third Party Drafts.
13.305-1 -General.
13.305-2 - Agency Responsibilities.
13.305-3 - Condilions for Use.
13.305-4 - Procedures.
13.306-SF 44. Purchase Order - Invoice -Voucher.
13.307- Forms.
Subpart 13A - Fast Payment Procedure
13.401-General.
13.402-Conditions for Use.
13.403- Preparationand Execution of Orders.
13.404- Contract Clause.
Subpart 13.5 - Test Proran for Certain Commercial Items
13.500-General.
13.501-5pecial Docunutation Recmrerments.
Figure 24: FAR Part 13 Table of Contents (U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation)
Additionally, as mentioned above, the guidance in the FAR is further refined for defense
acquisitions by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. This document also
encapsulates a tremendous amount of complexity. Compliance with the FAR and the appropriate
supplements are the responsibility of the contracting officers within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. The length and depth of these regulations are clear evidence that the
enterprise operates within a very complex environment.
7.3.2 Department of Defense 5000 Series Regulations
In addition to the FAR and its supplements which govern the contracting process. The Air
Force aircraft acquisition enterprise must also adhere to a set of DoD regulations known
collectively as the DoD 5000 series.
DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, provides the policies and
principles that govern defense acquisition. DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System, establishes the management framework that implements these
policies and principles. The Defense Acquisition Management System is an event-based
process. Acquisition programs proceed through a series of milestone reviews and other
decision points that may authorize entry into a significant new program phase. Details of the
reviews, decision points, and program phases are found beginning with in paragraph 3 of
Enclosure 2 of the Instruction. The Instruction also identifies the specific statutory and
regulatory information requirements for each milestone and decision point. (DAU, 2010)
As stated above, the directives and instructions describe a management system that includes
milestones and associated reviews by senior acquisition leaders. At its simplest, this process can
be described by the lifecycle view introduced above as Figure 13 and repeated immediately
below as Figure 25. However, this view is deceptively simple and does not capture the
tremendous amount of work that is required by the process to move from one phase to the next.
On Deels6 Point
Figure 25: DoD 5000 Acquisition System--Lifecycle view (DAU, 2010)
The table, included as Appendix A, was excerpted from DoD 5000.2 and lists all of the
statutory requirements each acquisition program must meet in order to proceed through each of
the milestones. While this table alone spans nearly seven pages, additional requirements not
shown in the table are levied on large Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major
Automated Information System programs (MAIS).
In addition to the published versions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations and its
supplements and the DoD 5000 series regulations, there is a host of policy memorandums and
clarifications in effect at any one time as shown in Figure 26.
Recent DoD policy memoranda, incudimg Directive-Type Memoranda (DTMs):
- Acquisition Policy for Defense Business Systems (DBS) (DTM 11-009)1 Dated 23Jun 2011
- Reliability Analysis, Planning, Tracing, and Reporting (DTM 11-003) 1 Dated 21 Mar 2011
- Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power - Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending I Dated 3 Nov 2010
- Development Planning to inform Materiel Development Decision (MOD) Reviews and Support Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) (DTM 10-017)1
Dated 13 Sep 2010; Change dated 16 May 2011
- Requirementsfor Life Cycle Management and Product Support (DTM 10-015)1 Dated 7 Oct 2010; Change dated 29 Apr2011
- Implementation of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 (DTM 09027) 1 Dated 4 Dec 2009; Change 1 dated 21 Oct 2010;
Chage2 dated 31 Aug 2011
- Space Systems Acquisition Policy (SSAP) (DTM 09-025)1 Dated 18 Oct 2010; Change dated 10 Jun 2011
- Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) to Improve the Integrity of Components Used in DoD Systems (DTM 09-016) 1 Dated 25 Mar 2010; Change
dated 16 Sep 2010
Other recent memoranda, including guidance and expected business practices:
- Document Streamlining -Life-cycle Sustainment Plan ( LCSP) I Dated 14 Sep 2011
- Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) Outline lWord version) I Dated 14Sep 2011
- Document Streamlining - Program Protection Plan I Dated 18 July 2011
- Pragram Protection Plan Outfne j Dated 18 July 2011
- Improving Milestone Process Effectiveness I Dated 23Jun 2011
- Improving Technology Readiness Assessment Effectiveness I Dated 11 May 2011
- Joint Memorandum on Savings Related to "Should Cost" I Dated 22 Apr 2011
- Document Streamlining - Program Strategies and Systems Engineering Plan I Dated 20 Apr2011
- Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) Outline I Dated 2OApr 2011
- Technology Developnent Strategy [a] Acquisition Strategy: Sample Outline I Dated 20 Apr 2011
- Expected Business Practice: Post-Critical Design Review Reports & Assessments I Dated 24 Feb 2011
- Interim Acquisition Guidance for Defense Business Systems (DBS) I Dated 15 Nov 2010
- Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending I Dated 14 Sep 2010
- Technology Development Strategy and Acquisition Strategy Documents I Dated 20 Aug 2010
Figure 26: Recent Defense Acquisition Guidance
The Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is governed by a large set of regulations and
policies. The bulk of these reside in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its supplements as
well as the DoD 5000 series regulations. The large number of these directives and the
organization necessary to implement them provide clear evidence that the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise is a highly complex system.
7.4 Research Result and Conclusion
A high level of organizational (structural and procedural) complexity exists
across the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
As one looks across all the three areas of personnel specialization/organizational structure,
resource management, and regulatory guidance and policies, it is evident that there is a
tremendous amount of both structural differentiation and organization present within the
enterprise. According to Tainter, this combination is the very definition of complexity, all of
which requires resources to maintain.
The high level of complexity present within the enterprise can be further categorized into
specific types beyond Tainter's general definition. Young, Farr, and Valerdi (2010) conducted a
thorough accounting of the types of complexities that influence system engineering cost
estimates. The examples of complexity discussed above can be characterized as organizational
complexity both structural as well as procedural.
Chapter 8 Evidence of Diminishing Returns
According to Tainter's theory of collapse, the level of complexity within a society reaches a
point where additional increases in complexity result in diminishing marginal returns. In other
words, each additional investment in the system results in less and less additional productivity.
Having established that the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is a large, highly
complex organization, the next step in applying Tainter's theory at the organizational level is to
explore whether the level of complexity has reached a point of declining marginal returns.
Just as Tainter found at the societal level, it is difficult to effectively isolate and determine
the costs and benefits of each quantum of increasing complexity within the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise. However, it is possible to gather evidence of declining returns by looking
for examples that meet one of the four conditions that result in declining marginal returns:
" Benefits falling with costs rising
e Benefits rising with costs rising faster
* Benefits constant with costs rising
* Benefits falling with costs remaining constant (Tainter, 1988)
8.1 An Independent Assessment
At the enterprise level, the primary perception among senior military leaders is that the
performance of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise has declined since the early to mid
1990s. A 2009 CNA research report commissioned by the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct
a "broad-ranging, top-to-bottom assessment of the current state of AF acquisition" provided a
very negative assessment of the enterprise:
Today the Air Force acquisition community is a mere shell of its former self, consisting
of approximately 24,000 military and civilian professionals, with no four-star seat at the
"Corona" table. Since the mid- 1 990s, not only has cost growth for Air Force programs been
rising at an ever-increasing rate, but it is worse than the cost performance of its sister
Services. Every day it seems, there is a new story in the public media suggesting Air Force
acquisition incompetence.
Certainly, the Navy has its Littoral Combat Ship, the Army has its Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter, the Marines its Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, but the Air
Force has its Space-Based In-frared Radar System, CSAR-X search and rescue helicopter,
and KC-X aerial tanker, now in its fourth attempt to award a contract. The Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, regularly rails against Air Force
acquisition performance. As recently as 27 January 2009, the Secretary of Defense, in
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, singled out the Air Force as an
example of the general deterioration of the acquisition workforce. (Christie, Davis, & Porter,
2009)
8.2 Benefits Falling with Costs Rising
In light of the Aeronautical Systems Center's mission to acquire aerospace weapon systems,
an indicator of the enterprise's performance is the state of the Air Force's aircraft fleet. There are
two primary factors that go into deciding that it is time to replace an existing aircraft type with a
new design: cost and military advantage. While Keating and Dixon, (2004) provide a decision
model for replacement of aircraft based solely on a cost comparison model, they acknowledge
that their model does "not consider technological change". The need to preserve technical
superiority over one's adversaries would seem to bestow an advantage on a younger fleet of
aircraft over an older one. This is especially true for aircraft designed for combat operations such
as fighters and bombers. Therefore, one would expect a well-functioning acquisition enterprise to
procure replacement aircraft at a rate that kept fleet aging in check in order to preserve military
benefit. However, as shown in Figure 27, the age of the Air Force's fleet continues to increase.
Additionally, the below chart was produced before the 2009 decision was made to limit the
production of the F-22 Raptor aircraft to only 187 aircraft (Matthews, 2009). If this change was
incorporated, the rate of aging for both the fighter and total fleets would further increase.
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Figure 27: U.S. Air Force Fleet Age (Mehuron, 2004)
While the benefits of the aging fleet continue to decline due to technical obsolescence, the
costs of maintaining the fleet continue to increase:
[Air Force] officials estimate that operation and maintenance costs have grown by a
staggering 180 percent in the last decade, largely due to extensive and continuous repairs
required on the airframes.
Older aircraft have known problems, such as overstressed center wing boxes on C-
13OEs, but old fleets are also plagued with "the unknown unknowns," the Air Staff's
Pennington said. "We simply haven't had airplanes that have flown this long [and] that
you're going to continue to fly," he noted, making it increasingly difficult to predict what
might break next. (Scully, 2007)
The Air Force's aging fleet is clearly an example of diminishing marginal returns. Keeping
aging aircraft flying provides a smaller level of military benefits over time while the cost to
maintain that fleet continues to increase.
Another example of benefits falling with costs rising can be found by examining the internal
processes that govern defense acquisition within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
Professor Jan Kinner at the Defense Acquisition University provided a set of slides summarizing
an analysis of the DoD 5000 series acquisition process performed by an anonymous Army
officer. The draft presentation asserted that a "notional acquisition program created to provide a
basis for analysis" would "likely take 16.5 years to go from the Materiel Development Decision
to Full Rate Production." (Kinner, 2011)
The assumptions used by the anonymous Army officer were reasonable and assumed an
ACAT 1D program to procure a ground vehicle utilizing low to medium risk technologies. An
ACAT 1D program is one that requires DoD oversight due to its expected high dollar value. The
threshold for this designation is a projected cost "estimated by the USD(AT&L) to require an
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than
$365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.190
billion in FY 2000 constant dollars." (DAU, 2010) The general assumptions in the notional
program analysis included reasonable estimates for both approval processes and contracting
processes:
Documentation Assumptions
e Writing Milestone Documentation and going through WIPT/Stakeholder reviews
generally takes 6 months prior to submitting it for approval. "Living documents"
should be written earlier and updated throughout the program lifecycle.
" Approval process generally takes:
o PM: 5 business days, PEO staff: 5 business days, PEO: 5 business days
o OASA(ALT)/Army: 20 business days, AAE: 20 business days
o OSD: 20 business days, DAE: 10 business days
e Approval process known to take longer (JCIDS, AoA, cost documentation, etc.) use
appropriate extended timelines.
" All documentation (including test evaluations) are due to OSD 45 business days prior
to the DAB
Contracting Assumptions
e There will be a down-select of Contractors between each phase (from 3 to 2 to 1), and
long lead is purchased during the previous phase.
" Proposal preparation takes at least 6 months, requests for proposal (RFP) are on the
street for 3 months, and negotiation/evaluation takes 6 months.
e There will not be any protests. (Kinner, 2011)
A key take away from the Army officer's analysis was that coordination and approval of
required documentation through the system can end up determining the length of a DoD 5000
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series compliant acquisition program. In other words, the approval of documentation occupies a
place on the program's critical path. This is especially true if the technology being used is low or
medium risk. Therefore, "no matter how much design, build and test are reduced", the overall
process will still result in elongated acquisition timeline (Kinner, 2011).
In today's competitive, fast-paced technological environment, an acquisition process that
can be expected to take 16.5 years to complete is one that provides less benefit than a process
that delivers new capability faster. Additionally, a program with such a long duration consumes
considerably more resources in the form of overhead costs than a shorter program. Therefore,
the DoD 5000 acquisition process is clearly providing diminished marginal returns since benefits
are falling and costs are increased in comparison to the shorter duration, less complex acquisition
processes of the past.
8.3 Benefits Rising with Costs Rising Faster
Tainter and Patzek (2012) specifically address diminishing returns in military hardware
acquisition in the following excerpt:
Competition spurs complexity, as each competitor seeks to outdo its rivals... Military
hardware grows increasingly complex and capable, but also increasingly costly. The
growing costs mean that fewer and fewer weapons can be procured. The United States ended
World War II, for example, with a fleet of 32 aircraft carriers, and with several more in
production. Today the U.S. Navy struggles to support 11 carriers. These are, to be sure,
highly capable weapons platforms, but 11 carriers cannot be in 32 places at once. In this
sense, the cost of complexity constrains capability. Similarly in the early years of the Cold
War, the U.S. produced 744 B-52 strategic bombers. Many of them are still flying today,
and some are expected still to be flying in the 2030s. When the B- 1 bomber entered
production in the 1980s, only 100 were made. Of the most recent strategic bomber, the B-2,
merely 21 were produced.
Those are 21 amazing planes, but they can only be in 21 places at the same time. The
military refers to this process as the death spiral. Because of high costs, fewer planes are
bought. The cost of each plane rises, even fewer planes are bought, and the unit cost rises
still further. It is an inevitable outcome of complexification, whether in military technology
or in other areas of our lives. Whenever we must escalate technology to accomplish our
goals, even to maintain the status quo, the increasing costs will constrain capability.
A similar result occurred within the F-22 fighter acquisition program. In 1991, the projected
buy of F-22s was 650 aircraft at $ 1OOM per aircraft (Pearlstein & Gellman, 1991). By the time
the first F-22 aircraft became operational in 2005, the cost of each had increased to $360M
including developmental costs (Matthews, 2009).
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an acquisition program still underway, appears to be
following the same pattern:
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) took the Senate floor on Dec. 15 and described the F-35
fighter program as "a mess."
What upset the senator was not just that the cost of each plane had risen nearly 100
percent from its original estimate of $69 million to $133 million today, or the fact that
testing was only 20 percent complete while more than 90 planes had already been bought, or
the fact that software - key to 80 percent of the stealth plane's warfighting capability -
wouldn't be ready for another four years... (Pincus, 2011)
By January 2012, defense analysts were predicting a third F-35 program restructuring in
order to delay the production of 120 additional planes. The delay would allow time for the
completion of more development work as well as defer expenses into later year budgets:
Virginia-based defense consultant Jim McAleese said he expected the Pentagon to defer
production of well over 120 F-35 fighter planes until later years, cutting the cost of the
program by about 25 percent over that time period.
But he said it was crucial that the department was sticking to its overall target of buying
2,443 fighters for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. That, he said, would keep the unit
cost of the airplane from rising dramatically and triggering a congressionally mandated
review that could lead to the program's cancellation. (Shalal-Esa, 2012)
While new aircraft deliver greater benefits in terms of capability than the systems they
replace, their rising acquisition costs and extended schedules often result in smaller total
procurements and work to diminish each program's marginal return. In the aggregate, the
diminishing marginal return of each acquisition program contributes to an overall lower return
for the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise as a whole.
8.4 Benefits Constant with Costs Rising
As the highly complex acquisition enterprise conducts its business, it is inevitable that
unforeseen issues will arise. These issues must be surmounted in order to deliver aerospace
weapon systems. Even if one assumes that these issues do not diminish the benefits obtained
from the acquisition effort, it is likely that additional resources will be expended in the course of
resolving the issue. Therefore, they will still tend to diminish marginal returns.
8.4.1 Specialty Metals: A Case Study
When there is misalignment of goals and incentives between Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise stakeholders, productivity of the enterprise is reduced due to resources being diverted
from directly contributing to the mission. The following case study concerning specialty metals
demonstrates how such sociopolitical complexity can diminish returns and impact the
performance of the enterprise.
8.4.1.1 Origin of the Issue
Since the passage of the Buy American Act (BAA) of 1933, the U.S. Congress has actively
provided domestic suppliers with an advantage over foreign sources when competing for
government contracts. In 1941, additional legislation, known as the Berry Amendment, was
passed that placed additional restrictions on military related contracts:
The Berry Amendment, which dates from the eve of World War II, was established for
a narrowly defined purpose: to ensure that U.S. troops wore military uniforms wholly
produced within the United States and to ensure that U.S. troops were fed with food
products solely produced in the United States. Other industries, such as tools and specialty
metals, were added later. Originally enacted on the eve of World War II, it overrode
exceptions added to the Buy American Act of 1933 for products procured by the Department
of Defense. (Grasso, 2011)
Within the DFARS (252.225-7008 Restriction on Acquisition of Specialty Metals, July
2009), the term specialty metals is defined in the following manner:
(a) Definitions. As used in this clause-
(1) "Alloy" means a metal consisting of a mixture of a basic metallic element
and one or more metallic, or non-metallic, alloying elements.
(i) For alloys named by a single metallic element (e.g., titanium alloy), it
means that the alloy contains 50 percent or more of the named metal (by mass).
(ii) If two metals are specified in the name (e.g, nickel-iron alloy), those
metals are the two predominant elements in the alloy, and together they constitute 50 percent
or more of the alloy (by mass).
(2) "Produce" means the application of forces or processes to a specialty metal
to create the desired physical properties through quenching or tempering of steel plate, gas
atomization or sputtering of titanium, or final consolidation of non-melt derived titanium
powder or titanium alloy powder.
(3) "Specialty metal" means
(i) Steel-
(A) With a maximum alloy content exceeding one or more of the
following limits: manganese, 1.65 percent; silicon, 0.60 percent; or copper, 0.60 percent; or
(B) Containing more than 0.25 percent of any of the following
elements: aluminum, chromium, cobalt, molybdenum, nickel, niobium (columbium),
titanium, tungsten, or vanadium;
(ii) Metal alloys consisting of-
(A) Nickel or iron-nickel alloys that contain a total of alloying metals
other than nickel and iron in excess of 10 percent; or
(B) Cobalt alloys that contain a total of alloying metals other than
cobalt and iron in excess of 10 percent;
(iii) Titanium and titanium alloys; or
(iv) Zirconium and zirconium alloys.
(4) "Steel" means an iron alloy that includes between .02 and 2 percent carbon
and may include other elements.
(b) Any specialty metal delivered under this contract shall be melted or produced in
the United States or its outlying areas.
8.4.1.2 Foreign Competition Brings Attention
In order to gain additional insight in the impact of the Specialty Metal provision within the
Berry Amendment, an interview was conducted with Mr. Rick Buschagen. As a retired contract
officer and the former Chief of Compliance within the Aeronautical Systems Center Contracting
Functional, Buschagen had a unique first hand perspective on the evolution of the issue.
Buschagen's recollection concerning specialty metals begins in the mid-70s while serving as
a contracting officer in the F-16 program office within the Aeronautical Systems Center. He
remembers that restrictions on the origins of specialty metals were added to the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement at that time. Since e-mail was not yet in use, the policy
arrived at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base via postal mail and was greeted with little attention.
At the time, it was presumed that aerospace defense contractors were using domestic sources of
specialty metals (Buschagen, 2011).
Buschagen stated that the topic remained a "non-issue" until the 1990s and the end of the
Cold War. At that time, the Russians began exporting high-quality titanium at very competitive
prices. This foreign competition threatened domestic smelters of titanium and they appealed to
Congress for more stringent enforcement of the Berry Amendment's specialty metal provisions.
In response to this Congressional pressure, SAF/AQ dispatched a team of 14 lawyers and
contracting officers to Dayton with direction to check Aeronautical Systems Center contracts for
compliance. Buschagen went on to say that many contracts were found that did not properly
include the clause. This determination was the beginning of a lot of "turmoil" within the ASC.
The enterprise struggled with how to deal with weapon systems that were found to include
titanium whose origin was questionable. The enterprise also struggled with how to handle the
situation going forward (Buschagen, 2011).
8.4.1.3 Withholding Payment
In the face of Congressional pressure and increased headquarters oversight, Aeronautical
Systems Center contracting officers began asking suppliers to identify products that were under
contract with foreign or untraced specialty metal content. When contractors reported that they
could not verify the source of their specialty metal content was domestic, government
contracting officers began refusing delivery. An example of the Air Force refusing delivery of
F- 15 aircraft with questionable specialty metal content is illustrated in the below excerpt from an
internal program office monthly report. Since the Air Force did not accept delivery of the
aircraft, Boeing did not receive expected payments:
a. Pursuant to the contracting officer's letter dated December 29, 1999, relative to the
Russian titanium issue, aircraft #222 & #223 were not accepted in December. Boeing did
not request an exemption to the statute nor a waiver to DFARS 252.225-7014, preference for
domestic specialty metals. We were further instructed to make no further payments,
including progress payments, for aircraft containing Russian melted titanium.
b. Presently, Boeing is withholding submittal of progress payments totaling $7.1 mil. In
addition, Boeing is unable to invoice the unliquidated value of 2 aircraft equating to $16.9
mil. (F-15 System Program Office Monthly Report, 2000)
According to Buschagen, to allow delivery of products with questionable specialty metal
content, contracting officers began using two workarounds. Since the use of appropriated funds
could not be used to purchase foreign specialty metals, some contractors agreed not to charge the
government for the cost of the individual components where compliance could not be verified.
In cases where the contractor would not agree to a discount, the contracting officer would
reduce the payment made to the contractor for the cost of the non-compliant components,
"withholding" the difference until the contractor could verify compliance or agreed to replace the
questionable material. These withholds became contract contingencies that remained open for the
remaining life of the contract, placing an additional administrative burden on the system. This
second approach often resulted in conflict between the government and suppliers over the size of
the withhold contingency and what paperwork and/or changes were required to become
compliant. Some contractors initially refused to deliver finished products if withholding
contingencies were stipulated but most eventually acquiesced in order to receive at least partial
payment (Buschagen, 2011).
8.4.1.4 Commercial Derivatives and Fasteners
According to Buschagen, two issues were responsible for the majority of specialty metal
problems. The first issue was acquisitions involving derivatives of commercially produced
aircraft. In the commercial world, there were no restrictions on the use of foreign titanium. Prime
contractors such as Boeing were therefore loathe to set up two supply chains for commodities
such as titanium, especially if the size of the military acquisition program was much smaller than
sales in the commercial market (Buschagen, 2011).
The second issue involved fasteners such as screws, bolts and retaining clips. Prime
contractors often specified and used commercially produced fasteners in their military products.
Since the majority of fasteners were produced for commercial users, documentation as to the
origin of the specialty metal used in fastener production was non-existent. Since military fastener
use was dwarfed by commercial uses, it was difficult to get fastener manufacturers to verify
compliance at any cost (Buschagen, 2011).
One case involving the B-2 bomber demonstrates the magnitude of the problem. According
to Buschagen, Northrop-Grumman could not verify that 18 fasteners used within the radar
system were compliant with the Berry Amendment. Each of the fasteners was valued at less than
$20 apiece. However, replacing the fasteners on an already completed bomber required upwards
of $3M in disassembly/reassembly costs (Buschagen, 2011).
8.4.1.5 A Continuing Battle
As contracting officers struggled to enforce the provisions of the Berry Amendment, both
aerospace prime contractors and specialty metal producers continued to lobby Congress to settle
the issue in their favor.
Congressional testimony in 2003 by Mr. Timothy Rupert, President and CEO of the Ohio
based titanium smelter RTI International Metals, demonstrates level of stakeholder intensity
surrounding the issue:
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity to testify here today on a
matter of critical importance to my company as well as to my industry. My name is Timothy
G. Rupert. I am the President and CEO of RTI International Metals, Inc. I am also the
President of the International Titanium Association. Titanium due to its unique strength-to-
weight ratio is critical to the production of jet aircraft. In fact, the industry was born out of
the military's need for high performance metal from which to build key components of new
jet fighters, as Ms. Patrick has already testified. It is for this reason that in 1973 Congress
placed titanium, along with other specialty metals, under the protection of the specialty
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metals clause of the Berry Amendment, requiring that specialty metals be produced
domestically. You cannot build military aircraft without titanium. Approximately 90 percent
of primary titanium production in this country comes from just three companies. Generally
three-fourths of the industry's product goes into the production of aircraft, both commercial
and military. These are small companies relative to their customers and following 9/11 they
comprise a financially fragile industry. Earnings have steadily declined over the past five
years, with the industry losing $163 million last year alone. To put that number in
perspective, it represents about one-fourth of our combined market value. Obviously, this
trend cannot continue much longer. The only other significant supplier in the world qualified
for critical aerospace applications is a Russian producer, VSMPO, whose capacity is larger
than the three U.S. producers combined. Yet while the domestic industry continues to
shrink, VSMPO's shipments and earnings have steadily grown, in large part due to favorable
treatment by the U.S. Government at the expense of domestic producers...
An even bigger threat to the U.S. titanium industry is the current attack on the Barry
(sic) Amendment. Increased military spending, particularly aircraft, is one of the few bright
spots in our marketplace. However, attempts to abolish or undermine the specialty metals
clause in what I will refer to as midnight waivers of its requirements threaten to take away
that lifeline. After operating as intended for 25 years, suddenly the specialty metals clause
has fallen victim to increasing misinterpretation, its requirements violated and its intent
ignored all together.. .The effect of these waivers has been to seriously weaken the U.S.
titanium industry and, in our opinion, if this trend continues, we believe that it will have a
direct and negative impact on national security. (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003)
The battle between the two interest groups dragged on for years while the DoD, the Air
Force and their prime contractors pursued waivers and "Domestic Non-Availability
Determinations" (DNADs). Guidance from DoD and the Air Force varied over time which
generated delays in the form of extended contract negotiations (Buschagen, 2011).
According to an October 2008 Aerospace Industry Association fact sheet, the specialty
metals issue continued to be a problem 17 years after the end of the Cold War increased the
availability of foreign titanium:
The United States has implemented extensive and complex rules aimed at restricting the
use of non-domestic "Specialty Metals" in the defense acquisition process. The stated goal is
to protect the U.S. defense industry from becoming overly dependent on foreign sources of
supply, especially in times of conflict. These rules are codified in public laws such as the
"Berry Amendment" (10 U.S.C. 2533a) and the National Defense Authorizations Acts of FY
2006 and 2007 (10 U.S.C. 2533b and revisions).
Since December 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) has issued an increasing
number of memos attempting to regulate, clarify and otherwise implement the intent of these
laws. Most of the legislative and regulatory changes over the last two years have been the
result of lobbying struggles in Washington and attempts to explain the application of the law
to a very confused domestic defense supply base. (Aerospace Industry Association, 2008)
8.4.1.6 Enterprise Impacts
While it is impossible to quantify all of the costs to the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise due to the conflict over the specialty metals portion of the Berry Amendment, it is
clear that a tremendous amount of time and resources were expended from the early 1990s to
2008 on the issue. The issue also created a large increase in performance-inhibiting complexity,
in the form of additional oversight, policy guidance and specialty metal origin tracking
documentation. Appendix B includes a March 14 th 2008 slide presentation by Buschagen
summarizing the guidance provided at that time to Aeronautical Systems Center contracting
officers. The 40-slide presentation is merely one artifact documenting the resources expended to
resolve the contentious issue.
In summary, the specialty metal issue is a good case study of how the competing interests of
a diverse set of stakeholders can increase the level of complexity and diminish returns. Even with
benefits of each acquisition program assumed constant, the additional resources expended
handling the specialty metal issue caused the marginal return of the enterprise to decline.
8.5 Research Result and Conclusion
The examples presented above describe three of the four conditions which result in declining
marginal returns. An aging aircraft fleet and an elongated acquisition approval process are both
examples where benefits are falling while costs are rising. The procurement of new aircraft with
their accompanying cost and schedule overruns are a good example of benefits rising with costs
rising faster. Lastly, the specialty metals case is an example of benefits remaining constant with
the costs rising. The last condition, benefits falling with costs remaining constant, was not
discussed since costs are rarely static over timeframes of interest. When one considers the above
evidence in aggregate, it is reasonable to conclude:
The level of investment in complexity within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
has reached a point of declining marginal returns.
Chapter 9 Responses to Complexity
The previous two chapters demonstrated that both a high level of complexity is present
within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise and that marginal returns are being
diminished. The next step is to examine the recurring efforts taken to improve the performance
of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise while relying on Tainter's framework to
understand why they have not been as effective as expected.
9.1 Cyclical Reorganizations
Tainter states that when a society begins to see marginal returns decline, it usually responds
to the "stress by increasing complexity. In doing so it increases investment in agricultural and
other resource production, in hierarchy, in information processing, in education and specialized
training, in defense and so forth." (Tainter, 1988) What Tainter observed at the societal level
appears to also hold true at the enterprise level. As can be expected of any customer, the
operational Air Force would like its new systems delivered faster and with less cost. Therefore,
leaders of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise are always under pressure to improve the
effectiveness of their organizations. Since the early 1990s, as performance of the Air Force
aircraft acquisition enterprise has declined, leadership has attempted to reverse the decline by
altering the organizational structure of the enterprise.
Between 1991 and 2010, the leadership of the Aeronautical Systems Center made significant
changes to the organization's structure five times in the pursuit of performance. All of these
changes required large time and resource investments in the form of planning, securing higher
headquarter approvals and the reorganization implementation itself. A reorganization therefore
increases complexity and diminishes marginal returns over the near term. Unfortunately, it
appears that over the longer term, effectiveness of the enterprise did not increase either.
In 1991, the hierarchy of the organization of the Aeronautical Systems Division was
relatively flat. Program offices reported directly to the three-star center commander and were
each singularly focused on an individual weapon system acquisition. For example, F- 15, F- 16
and Advanced Tactical Fighter (later F-22) program offices all directly reported to Lt Gen
Ferguson (Aeronautical Systems Division, 1991).
In 1992, Lieutenant General Ferguson began a series of hierarchical changes in order to
establish "an efficient workforce mix at ASD." As a result of the flat organizational structure, it
was found that management to worker ratios were low and that there was a perceived over
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reliance on support contractors. "Gen Ferguson's ultimate goal was to eliminate [support]
contractors, but his realistic short term goal was to restrict [support contractors] to less than 3%
of the ASD workforce." One reason behind this change was to free up funding for additional Air
Force personnel. While not explicitly stated in the historical documentation, it appears that Gen
Ferguson felt that a reduction in contracted employees would also increase organizational
effectiveness (Aldridge, Cornelisse, Kallander, Romesburg, & Wolf, 1993).
In May of 1993, Lieutenant General Fain assumed command of the Aeronautical Systems
Center and shifted the focus from workforce mix to the relationship between program managers
and functional leadership:
One primary programmatic concern of General Fain was the often abstruse relationship
between ASC's system program managers (SPDs) and the organization's functional
organizations.. .Of particular concern to him was the SPD's occasional difficulty in working
with the Integrated Engineering and Technical Management Office, known by its long time
organizational chart symbol "EN". While working in program offices during the 1980s,
General Fain observed that the EN home office exerted excessive and inappropriate control
over SPOs. More recently he observed the pendulum had swung too far in the other
direction. The program manager had achieved an inordinate amount of control with
collocated engineering personnel receiving inadequate guidance and support from the EN
home office. In an effort "...move the pendulum back to the middle...,"General Fain tasked
James F. Blair, Director of the [EN], to prepare a White Paper that would specifically define
the roles and responsibilities of SPDs and functionals. (Aldridge, Comelisse, Ferguson,
Kallander, & Romesburg, 1994)
The October 1994 organizational chart begins to diverge from the 1991 version. Functional
organizations for the first time are grouped together on one side of the chart while program
offices are organized by whether they are subject to programmatic oversight by the center
commander versus those that are only provided "resources and acquisition expertise to support
execution..." (Aeronautical Systems Center, 1994)
The organization structure again changed in 1996 with the introduction of an additional level
of management. Mission Area Groups (MAGs) and product support groups were created in the
face of SAF/AQ directed personnel grade and head count reductions. The program offices were
thus divided into categories based upon their mission area or product type. Some program offices
were merged and their programs were managed collectively at the group level. Other program
offices remained distinct and either reported to their respective mission area, product group
director or the center commander. Functional offices were also consolidated in order to
"accommodate continued downsizing of the workforce." The introduction of the MAG level of
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management was an attempt to encourage the "sharing of functional expertise to optimize the use
of manpower." The reorganization also had the side effect of once again strengthening the
program management leadership chain within the matrix structure while correspondingly
reducing the power of the functional reporting chain (Aldridge, Cornelisse, Ferguson, Narducci,
Dunn, & Romesburg, 1997).
In fiscal 1997, the pendulum again swung concerning the use of support contractors.
Although General Ferguson had worked to reduce the number of support contractors only five
years earlier:
Secretary Cohen wanted the DoD to have a mix of both organic and temporary
employees to maximize the benefit gained by permanent employees working toward the
organization's core mission while reaping the savings achieved by using non-organic
employees for peripheral support activities. (Aldridge, Cornelisse, Ferguson, Narducci,
Dunn, & Romesburg, 1998)
Lieutenant General Raggio assumed command of the Aeronautical Center on 1 June 1998
and "quickly made a number of changes which suggested that he had a somewhat different
vision for the Center and for his own role as commander... over the next few months General
Raggio also directed organizational changes which swept away significant elements of the
structure erected by his predecessors." (Aldridge, Cornelisse, Ferguson, Narducci, Dunn, &
Romesburg, 1999) By October of 1998, General Raggio had "ended five years of
experimentation with the fundamental organizational structure of ASC's organizational
community..." The resulting organization restored power to the functional organizations who
again managed workforce movement between discrete program offices (Aldridge, Cornelisse,
Ferguson, Narducci, Dunn, & Romesburg, 1999).
The organization of the Aeronautical Systems Center remained relatively stable for
approximately six years until 2003 when General Gregory S. Martin became the commander of
the Air Force Materiel Command. While assigned to Gen Martin's staff, I witnessed firsthand his
desire to alter the culture of AFMC which he felt had become insular with respect to the rest of
the Air Force. One manifestation of this desire was to change the organizational structure of the
centers so they would more closely resemble the structure of the operational Air Force. The
Aeronautical Systems Center, along with the other centers, was directed to adopt an organization
structured in the form of wings, groups and squadrons. Planning for the reorganization was
initially led by General Martin's special assistant, Colonel Andrew Weaver and spanned nearly
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two years before its approval and implementation in 2005. The new structure greatly increased
the power of the program management chain since program directors were now also
commanders with a higher level of authority over their workforce. The strength of the functional
home offices was viewed as greatly reduced. They now were seen to be acting in primarily a
consulting role to the commanders.
The wing/group/squadron structure proved to be very unpopular with the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise workforce and did little to improve interactions between the operational
commands and the acquisition community. In the course of conducting its 2009 independent
assessment, the CNA concluded that the new structure was actually detrimental:
Of the 48 interviews we conducted only one person thought the wing/group/squadron
(WG/GP/SQ) structure had been successful. These findings are consistent with CNA's
findings in 2006. We believe the wing structure is a major inhibitor to efficient and effective
execution of the acquisition process. It inhibits efficient reallocation of personnel resources,
disconnects employees from what should be their functional mentors and inhibits proper
career management. Furthermore, we were frequently told the command selection process
for wing commanders has resulted in wing commanders with little or no acquisition
experience. (Christie, Davis, & Porter, 2009)
In 2010, the wing/group/squadron construct was discarded and the Aeronautical Systems
Center assumed a structure that closely resembled its appearance in 1996. Wings were changed
into directorates which are very similar to the 1996 MAG construct. Functional power was also
increased with an increased level of workforce management authority. During this same
timeframe, the pendulum again swung against the use of support contractors. In 2009, the DoD
announced its intent to convert over 11,000 support contractors into government employees
(Aviation Dayton, 2009).
Figure 28a and Figure 28b provide a visual synopsis of the reorganizations and power shifts
that took place between 1991 and 2010. The colloquial analogy of a pendulum swinging between
two states is not far from the mark. Across the two decades, the organizational structure
alternated between more and less levels of structural hierarchy. Power between the two
organizational matrix dimensions (program management and functional) also alternated over
time as did reliance on support contractors.
Figure 28a: Aeronautical Organizational Structure (1991-1998)
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- Introduction of Wg/Grp/Sq structure
- Reduced strength of functionals
-Decrease support contractor force
- Increase gov't employee workforce
-Elimination df Wg/Grp/Sq structure
- Introduction of Directorate structure
- increased strength of functionals
Figure 28b: Aeronautical Organizational Structure (1998-2010)
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This long term organizational behavior is congruent with Tainter's theory. Leaders of the
Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise have expended considerable amounts of time and
resources over the past two decades in search of a better performing structure yet none of the
reorganizations appeared to have explored lowering the level of system complexity in any
significant manner. Problem solving has instead focused on the balance of authority between the
program manager and functional matrix dimensions and on the right mix of support contractors
and civilian employees. While these power shifts may have resulted in transitory improvement,
the underlying high level of complexity remained in place and continued to operate in a fashion
that reduced marginal returns. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the very act of reorganization
and its use of resources further diminished marginal returns during each reorganization. If future
reorganizations also fail to lower the level of underlying complexity, they will also fail to
improve overall system performance.
9.2 Senior Leader Improvement Initiatives
In addition to cyclical reorganizations, another response of leadership in the face of
diminishing returns is to introduce top-down initiatives intended to improve performance.
Tainter (1988) makes the observation that as complexity increases and returns fail to improve,
the hierarchy is forced to "allocate still more of a shrinking resource base to legitimization and/or
control." (Tainter, 1988) Two sets of initiatives are examined below. One set from the mid-1990s
and another more recent set from 2010.
9.2.1 Lightning Bolt Initiatives
In 1995, under the direction of Darleen Druyun, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force For Acquisition and Management, SAF/AQ issued a set of nine "Lightning Bolt"
initiatives intended to improve the performance of Air Force acquisition. Two more were added
to the list in the spring of 1996. As described in an Air Force presentation to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the lightning bolts:
1. Created a centralized Request for Proposal (RFP) support team to implement
acquisition reform in all RFPs, contract options, and contract modifications over
$1 0M.
2. Created a standing Acquisition Strategy Panel of senior-level Air Force acquisition
personnel.
3. Set goal to reduce the size of our program offices by 50 percent.
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4. Tackled policy creep that had created inconsistent acquisition policies across centers
5. Reinvented the Air Force process for reaching program milestone decisions.
6. Enhanced the role of past performance in source selections.
7. Replaced numerous acquisition documents with a Single Acquisition Management
Plan (SAMP).
8. Revised the Program Execution Officer (PEO) and Designated Acquisition
Commander (DAC) portfolio review to add a section that deals specifically with
acquisition reform.
9. Enhance our acquisition workforce with a comprehensive education and training
program that integrates acquisition reform initiatives.
10. Reduce the time from requirement definition to contract award.
11. Enhance the capabilities of our laboratories by adopting improved business
processes. (Dept. of the Air Force, 1999)
Many of the lightning bolt initiatives included measures designed to streamline the
enterprise, including a reduction in workforce size, simplified documentation and a greater
reliance on commercial standards versus unique government specifications. Following their
implementation, they were trumpeted as an overwhelming success. In his 1998 Annual Report to
the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense William Cohen included the following
paragraph:
Acquisition Reform. The Air Force is changing the culture of acquisition. The emphasis
is to provide weapon systems better, cheaper, faster, and in a more streamlined and
consistently smoother process. Virtually every new acquisition program is taking advantage
of commercial practices by altering its strategy toward commercial specifications and
standards, privatization, outsourcing, commercial off-the-shelf technology, and contractor
system responsibility. Through its Lightning Bolt initiatives in streamlining, teaming, and
innovative acquisition strategies, the Air Force has realized $6 billion in cost savings and
$11 billion in cost avoidance. Newer efforts focus on continuous improvement and
establishing strategic steps to ensure acquisition reform becomes the norm. To accomplish
these objectives, we will continue to advance the professional development of our
acquisition work force by providing quality continuing education and training. (Cohen,
1998)
However, the benefits realized from these reforms appear to have been fleeting and largely
limited to smaller, less complex programs such as the Joint Directed-Attack Munition (JDAM)
(Air Force News Service, 1999). Large, complex acquisition programs on the other hand
continue to exceed their original cost and schedule estimates. The Joint Strike Fighter program
formally began in 1996 just as the Air Force's Lightning Bolts were implemented.
Unfortunately, as Figure 29 shows, the Joint Strike Fighter Program's expected total program
cost increased by nearly 35% between 2001 and 2010.
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Figure 29: Joint Strike Fighter Program Performance (U.S. GAO, 2011)
9.2.2 2010 USD(AT&L) Initiatives
On September 14, 2010, Ashton B. Carter, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics issued a memorandum titled "Better Buying Power: Guidance for
Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending". The memorandum
enumerated "23 principal actions to improve efficiency organized in five major areas." Carter
further stated that the principal actions would be followed up with specific guidance in the form
of directives to the acquisition workforce (Figure 30).
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Guidance Roadmap
Ta MtAodbltv an  CMtMlCs Got
- Mandate affordability as a requirement
At Milestone A set affrdabNity target as a Key
Performance Parameter
- At Milestone B establish engineering trades showing
how each key design feature affects the target cost
- Drive productivity growth through Will CoetlShould Cost
management
- Eliminate redundancy within warfighter portfolios
- Make production rates economical and hold them stable
- Set shorter program timelines and manage to them
Incentivize Productivity & Innovation In Industry
- Reward contractors for successful supply chain and indirect
expense management
- increase the use of FPIF contract type where appropriate
using a 50150 share line and 120 percent ceiling as a point of
departure
- Adjust progress payments to Incentlvize performance
- Extend the Navy's Preferred Supplier Program to a DoD-wide
pilot
- Reinvigorate industry's Independent research and
development and protect the defense technology base
Promote Real Comoetitlon
- Present a competitive strategy at each program milestone
- Remove obstacles to competition
- Allow reasonable time to bid
- Require non-certifled cost and pricing data on single
Offers
- Require open system architectures and set rules for
acquisition of technical data rights
- Increase dynamic small business role In defense
marketplace competition
kmorove Tradecraft In Services Acouisinon
- Create a senior manager for acquisition of services In each component,
following the Air Force's example
- Adopt unlfonm taxonomy for different types of services
- Address causes of poor tradecraft in services acquisition
e Assist users of services to define requirements and prevent
creep via requirements templates
- Assist users of services to conduct market research to support
competition and pricing
- Enhance competition by requiring more frequent re-compete of
knowledge-based services
- Umit the use of time and materials and award fee contracts for
services
* Require that services contracts exceeding $1B contain cost
efficiency objectives
- Increase small business participation In providing services
Reduce Non-Productive Processes andBuacrv
- Reduce the number of OSD-level reviews to those necessary to support
major Investment decisions or to uncover and respond to significant
program execution Issues
- Eliminate low-value-added statutory proeses
- Reduce by half the volume and cost of Internal and congressional
reports
- Reduce non-value-added overhead imposed on Industry
- Align DCMA and DCAA processes to ensure work is complementary
- Increase use of Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs) to
reduce administrative costs
Sept 14, 2010
Figure 30: USD (ATL) Guidance Roadmap (Carter, 2010)
While 15 years separates the two sets of initiatives, there are definite similarities between
the two lists. Both sets of initiatives include measures designed to streamline the acquisition
process. Both sets also attempt to incentivize contractors to perform more efficiently. Secretary
Carter's guidance recommends the use of incentive-fee contracts and progress payments.
In the face of high complexity, poor programmatic performance and diminishing returns, the
reaction of senior leaders in 2010 is very similar to 1995. While both leaders issued sets of
initiatives intended to improve effectiveness of the enterprise, neither advocated scrapping the
highly complex existing system. This response is congruent with Tainter's observations at the
societal level. He points out that the latter alternative may be more advantageous to the society as
a whole but certainly not to the administrators of the current system (Tainter, 1988). Therefore
the underlying complexity tends to remain untouched, preventing significant improvement in
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marginal returns and overall system effectiveness despite the introduction of senior leader
initiatives.
9.3 Increasing Reliance on Workarounds
When individuals and organizations become frustrated with the performance of a system in
the face of diminishing marginal returns and high complexity, they engage in a behavior that
Tainter calls scanning: "The system as a whole engages in 'scanning' behavior, seeking
alternatives that might provide a preferable adaption." (Tainter, 1988) There are clear examples
of scanning occurring within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise. Two instances of such
behavior include the use of undefinitized contract actions and a growing reliance on alternative
organizational structures such as the Rapid Capability Office (RCO).
9.3.1 Undefinitized Contract Actions
Within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, a common workaround appears to be the
use of Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs):
When a requirement needs to be met quickly and there is insufficient time to use normal
contracting vehicles, federal regulations permit the use of a UCA. UCAs are binding
commitments used when the government needs the contractor to start work immediately and
there is insufficient time to negotiate all of the terms and conditions for a contract. UCAs
can be entered into via different contract vehicles, such as a letter contract (a stand-alone
contract), a task or delivery order issued against a pre-established umbrella contract, or a
modification to an already established contract. (U.S. GAO, 2007)
The key advantage of a UCA is that it allows for the immediate obligation of funds and
allows work to begin before contract terms and conditions are finalized. Program managers are
always under pressure to show they are making progress. One way progress is measured is by
tracking the obligation of funds. A UCA is a fast way to obligate up to 50% of expected contract
cost without first having to finalize often complex contract terms governed by the FAR and its
supplements.
In 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a review of the use of UCAs
that included the Aeronautical Systems Center (Figure 31). Among all of the UCAs reviewed,
about half of the UCAs were awarded just to maintain program schedules. "In addition, 10 of the
UCAs we reviewed were attributable to inadequate planning. For example, one UCA for the
continuation of ongoing services was awarded the day after the previous contract expired." (U.S.
GAO, 2007)
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Table 1: Obligations on Undefinitlzed Task and Delvery Orders during Fiscal Years
2004-2006 at Locations Visied
Obligations Number of
Location (dolars in millions) actions
Aeronautical Systems Center $524.7 91
Aviation and Missie Command 81.0 12
Naval Air Systems Command 8.0 5
Naval Sea Systems Command 49.3 1
Warner Robins Air Logstics Center 14.9 2
Total $677.9 111
Smucm GAO .iramiz of DOD d0.
Note- Thle Army's TACOM Ufe Cycle Management Cowriand reported no UCA orders during ttts
period. The National Geospallal-Infligence Agency had undefnninzed orders durtig this period but
does not track this tiformation for Ifs DOD contracts.
Figure 31: Undefinitized Contract Actions (U.S. GAO, 2007)
Overuse of UCAs is not surprising since they appear to be an effective effective scanning
behavior in the face of high complexity. Therefore it is not be surprising that the Aeronautical
Systems Center had 91 outstanding UCAs during Fiscal Years 2004-2005 (Figure 32).
Award Definitization Not-to-
data date exceed amount
Obligation Total dollar Contract/
amount at value at order
award award pricing type
Air Force
Aeronuical Systims Center
1 B-2 aircraft aft deck inner mold 2/17/04 8/17/04 $16,737,000 $8,368,500 N/A' CPFF
kits
2 Required navigational 9/5/02 12/23/03 5,250,000 2,146,118 N/A* CPAF
performance link for 0-17 aircraft
3 Common crypto applique for F-15 2/20/04 71/04 1.366.402 683,201 N/A' CPFF
aircraft
4 Enterprise suppoit infrastructure 5/28/04 7/24/04 1,508,938 1.131,704 N/A' FFP
5 Threat SIuational Awareness 12/19103 6/1/05 23,100,000 10,781,000 N/A' CPFF
System for B-1 aircrafi
6 Aircraft Defense Systems for Army 12/8/04 5/2/05 6,038.000 3,019,000 N/A' FFP
C-37A aircraft
7 Receiver/exciter controller 9/30/05 5/18/06 1,287,000 965,250 $965,250 FFP
upgrade kits
8 9 Lynx radar upgrade for Predator 7129/05 9/29/06 13,867.301 10.400,476 10,400,476 FFP
unmanned aerial vehicle
9 Tactical Micro Unmanned Aerial 2/8/05 5/18/05 2.202,337 1.101,169 2,202.337 FFP/T&M
Vehicle improvements
10 Receiver/exciter controller 5/19/04 2/25/05 5,938,414 4,453,811 8,889,104 FFP
upgrade kits for ASARS-2A radar
system
II Readiness spare package kits for 7/1/04 8/24/05 26,427,245 26.427,245 131,028.443 FFP
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle
12 Batilefield Air Targeting Camera 9129/05 3/8/06 619,862 309,925 309,925 FFP
Autonomous IIcro-Air Vehicles
Figure 32: GAO Reviewed Aeronautical Systems Center UCAs (U.S. GAO, 2007)
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Description of goods or
servies
It is also not surprising that among the 12 UCAs reviewed by the GAO at the Aeronautical
Systems Center, the average number of days before contract definitization occurred was 261.
Even though a UCA must be definitized in 180 days or less, there is little incentive for either the
government or the contractor to move quickly. Definitization involves dealing with all of the
complexity that was initially avoided.
Unfortunately, the use of UCAs does not benefit the enterprise as a whole over the long run.
Definitization must still be accomplished albeit now in a situation where the government has
much less leverage since some funding is already in the contractor's possession. While markedly
less work than contract definitizations, the effort expended to issue UCAs still consumed time
and resources that could have been put initially towards definitization tasks. Both of these factors
combine to further diminish the marginal returns of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
9.3.2 Use of Alternative Organizations
Another scanning behavior observed within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is
the use of alternative organizations. Rather than rely on the mainline organization (ASC), leaders
seek to improve their marginal returns by relying on alternative organizations with less
complexity. During interviews, two senior level acquisition professionals independently stated
that there is a strong incentive to keep an acquisition program classified as long as possible since
acquisition approval procedures within the classified realm are less cumbersome than the
approval coordination process that must be followed for an unclassified effort. A simple
illustration of why this is involves approval packages. Due to higher levels of security, there are
often a smaller number of people who must review and approve documentation before an action
can be implemented. The lower number of reviewers decreases the likelihood that the approval
documentation will be returned for changes.
While this scanning behavior continues, two senior-level ASC interviewees indicated that
procedures within the classified realm had become more stringent over the past few years and
that the advantage gained by keeping a program classified was no longer as large as it had been
in the past. This "tightening up" was described to be as a result of program failures within the
classified realm due to insufficient oversight.
Additionally, as a program grows in size, the benefits of streamlined approval processes are
overwhelmed with the costs of operating a large organization securely:
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In theory, so-called black world acquisition streamlines the process and lowers cost. Yet
here again the B-2 program offers a cautionary tale. It, too, was a totally classified program
but heavy secrecy actually imposes heavy costs. All the management, labor, and accounting
procedures integral to any major program were required for the B-2, but every single person
had to have a security clearance... clearances often took months, slowing the overall project.
New workers stayed on the program payroll while awaiting clearances... Kinnu and Waaland
later estimated that security alone added between 10 percent and 20 percent to the overall B-
2 program cost, a figure consistent with that for the F- 117 program. (Grant, 2012)
In an interview with another senior leader from the Aeronautical Systems Center, frustration
was expressed when discussing the Air Force's Rapid Capability Office, known within
acquisition circles as the "RCO". According to the Air Force's public fact sheet on the RCO, its
mission is described as follows:
The Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office expedites development and fielding of select
Department of Defense combat support and weapon systems by leveraging defense-wide
technology development efforts and existing operational capabilities. The Board of Directors
tasks the office directly to address needs that involve mission applications and operational
concepts requiring specialized expertise, and involve sensitive activities managed by other
government agencies. The office also conducts projects on accelerated timelines. (U.S. Air
Force, 2011)
The fact sheet also indicates that the organization's board of directors includes top
acquisition leaders including the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics as well as the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force chief of staff, and SAF/AQ.
The ASC senior leader believed that the Aeronautical Systems Center was being "passed
over" for work because "leaders in Washington" favored the streamlined approval processes in
place at the RCO versus the "zero-value added" processes that were in place at the Aeronautical
Systems Center. His frustration was centered on the belief that he and the Aeronautical Systems
Center were unfairly required to follow more stringent processes which reduced organizational
competitiveness.
Regardless of whether the senior leader's frustration is justified, it does appear that the RCO
is managing projects that otherwise would be managed at a product center. Examples from the
public fact sheet include the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle and a sensitive airborne receiver system
(U.S. Air Force, 2011).
Just as an electrical current will utilize the path of least resistance, Tainter's framework
indicates that individuals and organizations will also seek out the path of least resistance when
confronted with a highly level of complexity and diminishing marginal returns. If workarounds
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such as UCAs and alternative organizations are perceived to provide a pathway to accomplishing
an acquisition program more efficiently, it is to be expected that they will be utilized whenever
possible. One problem with this approach is it cannibalizes work from the mainline enterprise
further reducing its output and diminishing its marginal returns. Additionally, all work cannot be
transferred to an alternative organization without raising the ire of stakeholders in the primary
system such as employees and the Congress. These stakeholders will eventually react and restrict
the use of alternative pathways. Lastly, what may be expedient in the short term may impose
higher costs over the long term.
9.4 Survey Responses
In addition to the information gathered above documenting responses to a high level of
complexity, a survey of individuals was also conducted. The objective of the survey was to
verify both how individuals recognize that a program has grown too large and complex and what
typically is done in such circumstances. The focus was also kept at the program level versus the
enterprise level since that is the level where program managers and engineers have the most
experience.
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Howdoyou know a projector program has become too large?
The time to make decisions increases excessively?
Management beginsto sub-optimize, making decisions
that maximize only local outcomes?
Other Notable Written Responses:
- -~
RareIy NewtraI Sowtimg AhWwy
__l'
*Insufficient communication and sharing among participants o -- 
- [Peoplel lose track of the big picture w NWO 1 41 Sanw AhVs
-Working groups get so large that they're unwieldy
-To much rework
e Designers cannotget proper information in time
* Unable to explain mostfactson 1-2 slides
-Morale decreases
e ACAT I
-Schedule extends, cost ove rruns
s Loss of understanding of objectives and means toget there
* Teams make decisions without coordinating with other teams
- Annual budget of $1M+ is used onlyto "maintain", not to produce anything and there is no funding for the otherthings
*AKA "ACAT 1"
Figure 33: Survey Question 1 Responses
Figure 33 provides a listing of the responses to the first survey question. The majority of
respondents felt that as a program grows in size both the timeliness and quality of decisions at
least sometimes decrease. The comments are also insightful, identifying increasing rework,
declining information quality and reduced coordination as indicators that an effort has grown too
large. This result provides insight into how diseconomies of scale result in declining marginal
returns.
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What do people do in situations where the size or complexity
of a project has grown too great?
Increase the number of management levels?
Institute unnecessary or overly cumbersome processes?
Attempt to remain coordinated by holding additional meetings?
OltherNtable Written Res nse s:~
Never AreN NeutIra $omettes Always
.1
* Pretend nothing is wrong until the program just collapses
*Start picking at low-leveltechnical/presentation details
-Throw problemsoverthe wall
* More progress reports and metrics ever karey Meutrud someImes Atwys
-Lose sight of the important issues
-Gothe other way and try to simplify or reduce processesthatget in the way
- Instead of creating conditions for se f-organization...those at or near the top try to control and drive things from the top
through hierarchy
Figure 34: Survey Question 2 Responses
The responses to the survey's second question are summarized above in Figure 34. The
majority of respondents confirmed that increases in hierarchy at least sometimes occur as
programs become too large or complex. Respondents predominantly agreed that these increases
in hierarchy are in the form of increasing levels of management and additional processes. As
with question 1, this result also illustrates how diseconomies of scale work to decrease returns.
The comments also referenced other signs of increasing hierarchy including "more progress








What do people do in the face of very restrictive processesor
regulations that are perceived to hamper progress on a project?
Notable Written Responses:
eignore and work around
-Bypassthem
-Shutdown, become less productive
-Avoidthem!
-Ignore them (x3)
-Ignore them and pay the price later
' Get deviations and waivers
' Bypass whenever possible
- ACTDs (Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations)
' Loopholes
-Workarounds
- Play the game and/or get out
-Work around them (see "pushers" in Soviet Russia)
' Become angry and settle for "just a paycheck"and no accomplishment
- [People] lose their motivation to add value through collaboration and cooperation (and competition) and
focuson otherthings pursuing self-interest
Figure 35: Survey Question 3 Responses
The last question in the survey specifically asked respondents what people did in the face of
restrictive processes and regulations; the type of environment in an organization with a high level
of complexity and a high level of hierarchy. The responses confirmed that scanning occurs in the
form of seeking workarounds. Most responses either fall in the category of work arounds or
outright disregard for enterprise processes. This is congruent with Tainter's description of what
occurs when complexity becomes excessive. Individuals will engage in scanning behavior in an
attempt to find an easier way and boost returns.
Across all three questions, the survey's results provided additional insight into what occurs
within a program as its size and complexity increase. Diseconomies of scale result in the form of
extended decision times, increasing hierarchy and sub-optimization. Additionally, the survey
verified that when operating in such conditions, individuals will engage in "scanning" behaviors.
9.5 Research Results
The above research reveals that efforts to improve the performance of the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise tend to be similar in nature across time. Reorganizations follow a cyclical
pattern that tends to alternatively empower the program management or functional hierarchies.
Senior leader initiatives also periodically issue and mandate change to the enterprise's processes.
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Past reform efforts have been ineffective because they have failed to significantly address
the underlying complexity of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
Over the course of the last 20 years, productivity has not been enduringly improved
following multiple reorganizations and multiple issuances of new initiatives. At the macro level,
current performance of large acquisition programs is no better than their predecessors. For
example, the Joint Strike Fighter program is encountering the same types of issues that were
experienced during the development of the F-22 a decade earlier. The reason why these efforts to
improve are unsuccessful is because top-level reorganizations and sets of initiatives do not
significantly reduce the underlying complexity of the enterprise. Without such a reduction,
marginal returns remain diminished and overall performance does not improve over the longer
term.
In the face of continuing poor enterprise performance, individuals engage in scanning
behavior and seek workarounds.
One example of this is the use of undefinitized contract actions to expedite the obligation of
funds and program initiation. Another example is the use of alternative organizations that operate
at a lower level of complexity with higher marginal returns. Both of these examples do not
benefit the enterprise over the long run. UCAs must ultimately be definitized and with a lower
amount of leverage over the contractor. The use of alternative organizations reduces the output
of the primary enterprise further reducing its marginal returns to the detriment of a larger set of
stakeholders.
Lastly, survey responses demonstrated that individuals within an enterprise are cognizant of
when a program has grown too large and complex. The majority of respondents recognized the
symptoms from their own experiences. Congruent with Tainter, respondents also predominantly
identified workarounds as a way they overcome restrictive processes and regulations in high
complexity environments.
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Chapter 10 Research Summary and Conclusions
Cl: A high level of organizational (structural and procedural) complexity exists
across the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise
The Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise is a highly complex organization engaged in the
development of highly complex aerospace weapon systems. This high level of complexity is
evident in the areas of personnel specialization/organizational structure, resource management,
and regulatory guidance/policies.
An examination of the enterprise's workforce revealed a tremendous amount of
specialization across multiple disciplines including program management, engineering, logistics,
auditing and contracting. All of this specialization is organized and managed through a training
and certification system largely administered by the Defense Acquisition University. Coupled
with this high level of personnel specialization is a large matrixed organization led by a 3-star
general who serves as the Aeronautical Systems Center commander. Beneath him, the core Air
Force organization is divided into 5 mission-specific directorates, two geographical support
organizations and 10 functional organizations.
A great deal of complexity is also employed in the management of resources. A complex
FYDP structure is in place to ensure funding is used in accordance with congressional intent.
Performance is tracked using earned value management which requires significant complexity
including work breakdown structures and work package completion tracking.
The regulatory guidance and policies that govern the operation of the ASC are extremely
complex. In-depth knowledge and expertise is required to ensure compliance with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and its supplements including the Defense Federal Regulation
Supplement. Additionally, the entire acquisition approval process is highly structured and
governed by the DOD 5000 series regulations and their supplements.
C2: The level of investment in complexity within the ASC has reached a point of declining
marginal returns
Tainter (1988) outlines four sets of conditions where declining marginal returns result.
" Benefits falling with costs rising
e Benefits rising with costs rising faster
* Benefits constant with costs rising
e Benefits falling with costs remaining constant
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Chapter 8 provided examples for three out of the four sets of conditions. The below table
provides a summary of those examples.
Table 6: Evidence of Diminishing Marginal Returns
Condition Evidence Provided
Benefits falling with costs rising Aging aircraft fleet
o Technologically obsolescence
o Maintenance costs increase
Elongated Approval process
o Delay in fielded capability
Benefits rising with costs rising faster Procurement of new aircraft (F-22, etc)
o Cost and schedule overruns
o Unit cost increasing
Benefits constant with costs rising Increasing cost of regulatory compliance
o Specialty Metal case study
Competitive advantage in the military sphere can be a fleeting condition if not aggressively
maintained. Therefore, anything that delays the fielding of a new technology can quickly erode
the benefit provided by a weapon system. Alternatively, any event that increases the cost of
delivering a new weapon system diminishes the effectiveness of the acquisition process. Both
scenarios result in diminished marginal returns. Unfortunately, the high level of complexity
present within the ASC increases the probability of both scenarios.
C3: Past reform efforts have been ineffective because they have failed to significantly
address the underlying complexity of the ASC.
Efforts to improve the performance of the enterprise have generally been centered on either
reorganizations or set of improvement initiatives. Reorganizations tend to occur every few years
and for the most part follow a cyclical pattern that tends to alternatively empower the program
management or functional hierarchies within the matrix structure.
Sets of reform initiatives designed to improve the system are also frequently introduced by
senior leaders on a periodic basis. However, in spite of these recurring improvement actions,
productivity of the ASC has not enduringly improved. In 2009, an independent CNA report
described continuing poor performance:
In recent years, the Air Force has experienced a number of symptoms that indicate
problems with its acquisition system and processes. Some of the most pressing of these
symptoms have been:
" Frequent cost-schedule performance issues;
* Numerous Nunn-McCurdy Breaches;
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* Increased time to bring major systems to the field; and
e Successful protests by contractors on major programs. (Christie, Davis, & Porter,
2009)
The reason for continued poor performance is neither reorganizations nor sets of new
initiatives significantly reduce the underlying complexity of the enterprise. Tainter's general
theory of collapse is clear that without such a reduction, the marginal returns of the system do
not improve and overall performance does not improve.
C4: In the face of continuing poor enterprise performance, individuals engage in
scanning behavior and seek out lower complexity workarounds
Individuals within the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise will seek more effective,
alternative ways to accomplish their goals. These alternatives can be viewed as workarounds in
the face of performance diminishing complexity. One example of a commonly used workaround
is the use of undefinitized contract actions. They allow the obligation of funds before all contract
terms are negotiated. Because contract terms are governed by the highly complex Federal
Acquisition Regulation and its supplements which necessitates a long and cumbersome approval
process, contract definitization is difficult to accomplish on schedule.
Another example of a commonly used workaround is the use of alternative organizations.
By keeping programs classified or relying on outside organizations, complexity is avoided and
productivity is increased. While effective in the short term, workarounds do not benefit the
enterprise over the long run. They tend only to treat symptoms instead of the underlying disease.
Internal workarounds must eventually be legitimized requiring additional effort. The use of
outside organizations robs the enterprise of resources and reduces overall output of the primary
enterprise, further reducing marginal returns. As the enterprise becomes increasingly
marginalized, it becomes more susceptible to collapse.
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Chapter 11 Implications and Recommendations
11.1 Implications and Recommendations for Senior Acquisition Leadership
Examining the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise through the lens of Tainter's general
theory of societal collapse provides insight into why past improvement efforts have fallen short
This has implications for senior leaders contemplating efforts to improve enterprise performance.
11.1.1 Complexity as a Criteria
From the senior leader stakeholder perspective, the primary implication of this analysis is
that future efforts to improve acquisition performance must address the overall level of
complexity present within the system. Unless an improvement action will result in a significant
decrease in system complexity, it is not likely to generate increasing marginal returns over the
long term. As categorized by Young, Farr and Valerdi (2010), the focus should be on
organizational complexity within the management realm. Product complexity will remain high
due to the competitive pressure imposed by potential adversaries. However, the level of
organizational complexity, both structural and procedural, within the enterprise should be closely
examined.
R1: Prior to implementation, senior leaders should evaluate an improvement effort against
what effect it will have on system complexity.
The Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise has already reached and exceeded the level of
complexity when marginal returns begin to diminish. Therefore, unless an improvement
significantly reduces the level of specialization or organizational control within the acquisition
enterprise, it is likely to further decrease marginal returns and thus fail to markedly improve
performance over the long run.
R2: Senior acquisition leaders should actively work with other powerful stakeholders,
including DoD and the legislative branch, to reduce the level of complexity required by
enterprise regulations and policies.
Since a large amount of complexity is top-down driven in the form of policies and processes
mandated in the FAR and its supplements as well as the DoD 5000 series regulations, the focus
should "up" rather than "down" the chain of command.
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11.1.2 Examine Workarounds to Gain Insight
Identifying and examining workarounds has the potential to yield significant benefits. A
high use of workarounds in one organizational or procedural area is a clear indicator that the
complexity present in the formal system has grown too high.
R3: Workarounds used routinely should be identified and analyzed for
organizational insight
Individuals familiar with the operation of the enterprise will be able to provide a researcher
with a list of workarounds routinely used. These workarounds should be viewed for what they
are: the result of individuals engaged in scanning behaviors in an effort to obtain reasonable
marginal returns on their investments of time and effort.
Rather than being simply dismissed as unauthorized deviations, workarounds can be
harnessed as a source of potentially innovative ideas. The structure of the workarounds may be
emulated to help streamline processes, removing the components that are non-value added or
overly burdensome. At the very least, they can identify areas that would benefit from a reduction
in complexity.
11.1.3 Vulnerability to Collapse
As stakeholders have sought to solve problems and secure benefits, they have over time
irresistibly increased the level of complexity present across the Air Force aircraft acquisition
enterprise.
The level of complexity has reached a point where the system is now also vulnerable to
collapse. Tainter (1988) describes two scenarios of collapse which are modified here for
application to the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise:
1. As performance and marginal returns remain low or decline further, capital surpluses
(both physical and political) are depleted. Subsequently when a major stress impacts
the system (e.g., a large weapon system program Nunn-McCurdy breach), there is no
reserve of capital to draw upon. External stakeholders may then decide enough is
enough and bring about a collapse of the enterprise.
2. As performance and marginal returns decline further, stakeholders recognize
advantage by avoiding use of the enterprise altogether. These stakeholders then
''overtly attempt to fully break away" and either employ their resources elsewhere
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with alternative organizations or simply withhold resources. In either case, this is a
form of "soft collapse" where the enterprise becomes increasingly disregarded and
irrelevant.
While both scenarios have become real possibilities likely as complexity has increased,
scenario 1 is becoming increasingly likely due to the current economic state of the United States.
There is increasing pressure to reduce the federal deficit. Any realistic attempt to do so will
include cuts in military spending. Due to these constraints, the likelihood that a severe
acquisition failure will result in the collapse of the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise in its
current form is increasing.
11.1.4 A Beneficial Collapse?
If a severe acquisition effort failure precipitates a collapse of the entire enterprise, the results
would likely be catastrophic to the near term capabilities of the Air Force. Acquisition programs
would stall while powerful stakeholders worked to create a new system that protected their
interests.
Short of a collapse, it is incredibly difficult to get stakeholders to voluntarily reduce
complexity. Tainter and Patzek (2012) point out that at the societal level, "the Byzantine Empire
may be history's only example of a complex society surviving through simplification" and they
only did so only under extreme duress.
R4: Senior acquisition leaders should be prepared to advocate for a steep reduction in
enterprise complexity should a collapse occur.
Within the political sphere, a common rule of thumb is to never allow a serious crisis to go
to waste (Seib, 2008). Senior leaders should heed this and be ready to articulate a vision that
includes much less complexity that the current system. In the face of a collapse, stakeholders are
more open to significant structural changes. Having a strong, consistent message that advocates
for a reduction in complexity will help ensure that a collapse doesn't result in the emergence of
an even more complex and constrained replacement. If complexity is greatly reduced as a result
of a collapse and marginal returns are significantly increased, the collapse may actually benefit
the greater Air Force enterprise over the long term.
119
11.1.5 Extensions and Limitations
While this work has focused on the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise, it is only a
subset of the larger defense acquisition system within the Department of Defense. Furthermore,
while it is a large federal department, the Department of Defense is only one of 15 cabinet level
departments within the Executive Branch of the United States. Among the remaining 14,
included is the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy and the Department
of Veterans Affairs. Since all of these departments are similarly structured and subject to the
same human problem solving routines that tend to increase complexity, it is reasonable to
contemplate similar complexity issues existing across the entire federal agency enterprise.
Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations given here for use at the Air Force aircraft
acquisition enterprise are likely to also provide insight into how to improve effectiveness at the
larger scale as well.
One fundamental difference between applying Tainter's theory at the societal level and at
the enterprise level is that at the enterprise level, there is a higher level organizational entity that
can intervene to prevent collapse. When this occurs, the intervention often requires the
commitment of additional resources, allowing the enterprise to continue functioning yet
simultaneously further diminishing marginal returns.
A recent example of a higher level entity bailing out a subordinate enterprise is the financial
bailout of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While the root
cause of their failure is not relevant to discuss here, as part of the 2008 financial crisis, both firms
were pushed "toward insolvency and into government control. Since then, the two companies
have borrowed more than $153 billion from a U.S. Treasury Department lifeline to continue
operating." (Bloomberg, 2012)
As long as such interventions are possible, the predictive power of Tainter's theory at the
enterprise level is limited. Collapse can be indefinitely deferred through periodic intervention by
a larger parent entity. However, one should consider that the resources available to the higher
entity are also finite. As the marginal returns of the parent entity are reduced, it too is subject to
collapse. In fact, the collapse of a society in the aggregate is likely preceded by the need to
frequently intervene to stave off collapse at the enterprise level. The interrelationship between
enterprise and societal collapse is an area for future research.
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11.2 Conclusion and Summary of Research Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, Tainter's theory provides senior leaders with an explanation why past reform
efforts have fallen short of their objectives. The theory also provides leaders with insight into
how to structure future reform efforts including harnessing current workarounds for insight.
Lastly, senior leaders should be prepared to articulate a new vision should a collapse of the
current enterprise occur. A summary listing of the resulting conclusions and recommendations is
provided below:
Research Conclusions
e Cl: A high level of organizational (structural and procedural) complexity exists across
the Air Force aircraft acquisition enterprise.
* C2: The level of investment in complexity within the ASC has reached a point of
declining marginal returns.
* C3: Past reform efforts have been ineffective because they have failed to significantly
address the underlying complexity of the ASC.
" C4: In the face of continuing poor enterprise performance, individuals engage in
scanning behavior and seek out lower complexity workarounds.
Recommendations
* R1: Prior to implementation, senior leaders should evaluate an improvement effort
against what effect it will have on system complexity.
" R2: Senior acquisition leaders should actively work with other powerful stakeholders,
including DoD and the legislative branch, to reduce the level of complexity required by
enterprise regulations and policies.
* R3: Workarounds used routinely should be identified and analyzed for organizational
insight.
" R4: Senior acquisition leaders should be prepared to advocate for a steep reduction in
enterprise complexity should a collapse occur.
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Appendix A: DoD Instruction 5000.02 Enclosure 4
Statutory and Regulatory Information and Milestone Requirements
Table 3. Regulatory Requirements Applicable to All Acquisition Programs (unless otherwise
noted). Regulatory policy applicable to Acquisitions of Services is discussed in Enclosure 9.
Information requirements stated in this table do not apply to these acquisitions unless
specifically addressed in Enclosure 9.
INFORMATION SOURCE WHEN REQUIRED
REQUIRED
Acquisition Information DoDI 8580.1 (Reference (ai)) MS A
Assurance Strategy (All IT-
including NSS) This Instruction MS B
MS C
Full-Rate Production DR (or
Full Deployment DR)
Acquisition Strategy This Instruction Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
MS C
Full-Rate Production DR (or
Full Deployment DR)





Affordability Assessment This Instruction MS B
MS C
AoA This Instruction MS A
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MS B (updated as
necessary)
MS C (updated as
necessary)
Full Deployment DR (for
AIS)
AoA Study Guidance This Instruction Materiel Development
Decision (updated as
necessary)
AoA Study Plan This Instruction Immediately following the
Materiel Development
Decision consistent with
MDA Direction (updated as
necessary)
APB This Instruction Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
MS C (updated, as
necessary)
Full-Rate Production DR (or
Full Deployment DR)
CDD Reference (h) Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
CIO Confirmation of CCA This Instruction MS A
Compliance (See Enclosure 5)
Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
MS C (if Program Initiation













(CARDs shall be prepared
according to the procedures
specified in Enclosure 7 of this
Instruction)






- Full-Rate Production DR
For MAIS
- Any time an Economic
Analysis is required-either
by statute or by the MDA
Corrosion Prevention Control DoDI 5000.67 (Reference MS B
Plan (aj))
(part of Acquisition Strategy) MS C
(ACAT I only) This Instruction
CPD Reference (h) MS C
Defense Acquisition Executive This Instruction Quarterly
Summary (MDAPs and MAIS
only) Upon POM or BES
submission
Upon unit cost breach
DoD Component Cost This Instruction MS A
Estimate
(mandatory for MAIS; as For MDAPs
required by CAE for MDAP)
- Program Initiation for
Ships
-MSB
- Full-Rate Production DR
For MAIS
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- Any time an Economic
Analysis is required-either
by statute or by the MDA













(if required by the office of the
Director, Defense Research
and Engineering)
This Instruction MS B
MS C
Information Support Plan DoD Directive 4630.05 Program Initiation for Ships
(ISP) (All IT-including NSS) (Reference (ak)) (Initial ISP)
DoD Instruction 4630.8 MS B (Initial ISP)
(Reference (al))
CDR (Revised ISP) (unless
waived)
MS C (ISP of Record)




Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Manual 3170.01
(Reference (am))
CJCSI 6212.01 (Reference





IUID Implementation Plan DoD Instruction 8320.04 MS A (summarized in SEP)
(Reference (ao))
MS B (annex to SEP)
MS C (annex to SEP)
LCSP; This Instruction MS B
(part of Acquisition Strategy) MS C
Full-Rate Production DR
Life-Cycle Signature Support DoD Directive 5250.01 MS A (summarized in TDS)
Plan (Reference (ap))
Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
MS C (updated as
necessary)
Net-Centric Data Strategy Reference (1) MS A
(Approach summarized in
TDS and detailed in ISP) Program Initiation for Ships
MS B
MS C
Operational Test Agency This Instruction MS B
Report of Operational Test and
Evaluation Results MS C
Full-Rate Production DR
PDR Report This Instruction MS B
Post-PDR Assessment if
PDR is conducted after MS
B
Post-CDR Report This Instruction Post-CDR Assessment
Program Deviation Report This Instruction Immediately upon a
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program deviation
Program Protection Plan (PPP) Reference (m) MS A (CPI stated in TDS)
(for programs with critical
program information) MS B
(includes Anti-Tamper Annex)
(also summarized in the MS C
Acquisition Strategy)
Spectrum Supportability DoD Directive 4650.1, MS B
Determination (applicable to Reference (aq)
all systems/equipment that use MS C
the electromagnetic spectrum
in the U.S. and in other host
nations)
System Threat Assessment This Instruction Program Initiation for Ships
Report (STAR)
DoD Directive 5105.21 MS B
- validated by Defense (Reference (ar))
Intelligence Agency (DIA) for MS C
ACAT ID programs) Reference (q)
- validated by DoD DIA Instruction 5000.002
Components for ACAT IC (Reference (as))
programs
- Programs on the DOT&E
Oversight List require a STAR
regardless of ACAT
designation






- validated by DoD
Components for ACAT II
programs












Systems Engineering Plan This Instruction MS A
MS B
MS C
TDS This Instruction MS A
(ACAT 1I and below)




TEMP This Instruction MS B
MS C (update, if necessary)
Full-Rate Production DR (or
Full Deployment DR)
TES This Instruction MS A
Appendix B: Berry Amendment Slide Presentation








What is the Background of Berry Amendment
and Specialty Metals?
-Stuatory rqummreet - Codified as 10 U.S.C. 2533a,
-Had its angin inthe 1941 Appqmnatioos Art - The Berry Am..hmtwas
angin=Ay passed by Compss to pwmxot the purchase of certai U.S.
oamds. The Bany Aund msntrict DoD fomusag qappnated fids,
or finds wise made availad fr pcumment of certam and imms th
as not geou, rqpoenssed, resed, or prodxed s e United Sttes
-Mdified ia 1972 to -whe "Specialty Meals."
-Section 842 of the Joln Wam Natiawal Defese Andrnea=ion Act
(NDAA) for FY 2007 (Pub. Law 109-364), -wiiled "Protecion of Strategie
Materals Cstxal to National Secunty" established new ponsaans specific
to qpecialty mndas codified as 10 U.S.C. 2533b. FY 2008 NDAA further
en-c spay mnda t 3
V Aeronautical Systems Center 5
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What are the Berry Amendment
Restrictions?
-The Berry Ammanemt matricties is 10 U.S.C. 33a
- relaed to food, cding and fabics
- coutme. to aply to DoD pxro auuu-
-Law retrict buyiag
- ataie or Al n of fod; eo g tapauns, or coes
coa= and oher mnaA fibw prdnets; wo silk or woaven slk
blends, sp silk pm fr cndge cine syuete fahic or
coastd s ie fabic (asi atextil ibes ad yams &at
at fr we n such fahnes); canas products, er wool(=wheaer a
the fnm of fiber oryam or c=*inad in fhri maleak or
namu&dacsud aticles); or any ikm of indsal equeime==t
(Fedeal Sw*py Class 9465) ma=ar-mAd fian or ~.mmng













































What are the Exceptions to the
Specialt etaIs Requirenents?
- National Security Waiver
The Under Secretary of Delenue forAcquisiion,
Technology and Lopdims (USD(ATSL)) may dtenine
in wriling that acceptance of an end ilen cortaiing
noncrnplint matenals ia necessay to 1he nalional
securly interes of fth U.S. This &ahorty applies
only to non-comipiance discovered alter conract
amad.
13
More about the COTS Exemptions from
the FY08 NDAA 4W
A COTS item exemption was added by the FY06 NDAA
for COTS items, but included exclusions. Here is a
summary of what is and isn't exempt when it comes to
commercial products:
- Direct acquisitions of specialty metals which are mn products
are not exemut (Exanples of mill products: bar billet, slab, wre,
plate md sheet.)
- Forg~gs or casting incorporated into a COTS end iam are
exempt
- COTS high performance muagnets incorporated into a COTS end
Reingm exempt.
- COTS fasteners incorporated into a COTS end item MM exempt.
15
What is considered COTS?
A Dmn=4hw Dn.Frwvaw.~AZw
"Commercially available off-the-shelf item" (COTS) is
defined In ALTERNATE I (DEVATION 2008-00002) as any item
of supply that is:
A comfercial iem (as defined in FAR 2.101);
Sold in substantia quantRies in the commercial narketplace;
Ofered to the Govenunent, under a contract or sudcontract at
any tier, wtihout mnodiication, n the sunsa form in which it is sold
in the commercial markelplace; and
Does not include bulk cargo, as defined in section 3 of the
Shipping Act of 1964 (46 U.S.C. App. 1702), such as agricultural
Products and petroeem product
14
More about the COTS Exemptions from
the FY08 NDAA (v
- Comerciel fasteners not incorporated iW a COTS items are
mesmt f the mnfactur certilies in good fai that It wil
purchase during the relevant calender year, an amount of
domesi specialy metals not less than 50% of the total mount
of specialty metals needed to produce such fasteners for al its
customers. This is referred to as the "rWht basket" approach
to compliance.
- The COTS exemption ia applied when the COTS item s first
purchased atlie lowest level ofete O a pli
chL A COTS item is considered to be "olered wifhoet
nodicaton" as long as it is not modified pror to contractual
acceptance by the next higher tier in the supply chain. Here's
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